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 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110010-2

Nevertheless, Husak's "normalization" program has not included the administrative and police practices prevalent during the early days of the Novotny regime. Husak, himself a victim of a purge of so-called Slovak "bourgeois nationalists" in the early 1950's, successfully opposed putting the reformers on trial, at least not for their activities prior to the invasion. His success in deflecting the more severe reprisals advocated by the party's ultraconservatives, however, has led to squabbling among the leadership. The question of how to deal with the leading figures of the reform era remains a major point of contention 5 years after the years of 1968. While one faction apparently feels that the time has come to use selectively the talents of the Dubcek reformers in economic affairs and cultural efforts, the ultraconservatives voice paranoid concern over the continued danger posed by these "rightist opportunists."

Husak seems to favor a policy of "differentiation." He would separate the ex-reformers into an irredeemably "hard core" responsible for the events of 1968, and "honest Communists" who were merely duped and who can return to the mainstream of Czechoslovak life by recanting. Although most of the country's technical experts appear to have reached a modus vivendi with the regime, most creative artists and other intellectuals have resisted all the regime's blandishments and have boycotted the party-controlled cultural organizations. As a result, the country has become a cultural wasteland. Within the party, Husak has repeatedly counseled patience in dealing with the intellectuals, and in 1973 there were some signs that a less oppressive cultural policy might eventually be instituted.

Husak has taken a well-publicized interest in popular welfare. More and better consumer goods are available, and for the most part, the populace has responded by grudgingly granting qualified acceptance to the Husak regime. Even more important, Husak has been accepted by the Soviets. Soviet party chief Brezhnev made it clear during his visit to Prague in February 1973 that Husak has passed the performance test, ending speculation that his stewardship over the party would be temporary and that he would be replaced by a more reliable conservative.

In spite of all of this, the Czechoslovak regime's claims to domestic "normalization"—i.e., that the "Prague Spring" has been obliterated—are a sham. Internal repression, though hidden behind an aura of material prosperity, is harsher than it was in 1967, and leaders of the reform are in exile, in jail, or at least out of the way. Neither their erstwhile supporters nor their opponents who are now in power can forget the impact of the reformers. Indeed, current policies are what they are in large part because the reformers once held sway and because they continue to influence, even if negatively, the thinking of the leadership.

Although Prague has become more active in the field of foreign relations since late 1972, its activities in the field clearly remain circumscribed by the necessity to conform to the wishes of the Soviet Union. Indeed, Czechoslovakia is the loudest proponent of the "coordinated socialist foreign policy" that Moscow has called for from its allies. The Husak regime, however, will do what it can to utilize the openings created by the Soviet policy of detente to seek further recognition of its legitimacy.

On the other hand, the potentially corrosive impact of detente will perhaps be felt more in Prague than elsewhere in Eastern Europe. It should be noted that Moscow's rationale for the 1968 invasion was in large part to counter the danger stemming from Dubcek's inability to resist the alleged subversive influence of Western ideas. Husak inherited this rationale, but it now appears as if he may have to contend with much the same Western influence as a matter of policy, treading a tightrope between the impact the West will have on popular expectations and the demands of Soviet-imposed discipline. His success in this, as in all his other goals, is by no means a foregone conclusion.

B. Structure and functioning of the government (C)

1. Constitutional developments

The present "socialist" constitution of Czechoslovakia was promulgated on 11 July 1960, replacing the one adopted in 1948. A new constitution, which would have codified the reforms of the Dubcek regime's "democratization" program, was in the process of formulation in 1968. It became a casualty of the August invasion, however, and is now a dead letter. By early 1974 the Communist leadership had given no indication that a new constitution was being considered.

The 1960 constitution changed the name of the country from Czechoslovak Republic to Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and accorded the nation the distinction of being the second to achieve the status of a "socialist state," after the U.S.S.R. The constitution is important not only as a legal document but also as a reflection of political and social changes imposed since the Communist accession to power in 1948. Like constitutions of all countries ruled by Communist

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110010-2