Page:NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 18; CZECHOSLOVAKIA; ARMED FORCES CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110009-4.pdf/11

 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110009-4

Explicit orders are sent by cable or radio to all headquarters and administrative offices concerned. These orders specify the date and type of mobilization (total or partial), the individuals who must report for duty, property that is to be diverted to military use, and special laws and regulations that are to be used during the mobilization period. Once the reservist becomes aware of the mobilization proclamation, he proceeds according to instructions contained in his service book to the mobilization period indicated.

Because of high physical and educational standards and the prevalent technical aptitudes of the people, the Czechoslovaks provide basically excellent military manpower. The Czechoslovak soldier does not normally exhibit a martial spirit comparable to that of most other East European soldiers, though he responds well to discipline. The Czechs and, to a lesser degree, the Slovaks, are relatively passive in temperament and generally submit to authority without active resistance, although there is a strong tradition of Schweikism or passive resistance. In general, personnel of the air force and the security forces are of a higher caliber—with better education and greater political reliability—than those of the ground forces.

b. Morale

The Communist regime is constantly striving to make military life more attractive to the youth of the country. During the period from 1948 to 1956 many officers were brought into the armed forces more for their political reliability than their military proficiency, and they have since been replaced by competent officers trained in the improved military school system. Better food and living quarters, more recreational facilities, and a more liberal pass policy have been provided. In addition, the law on service conditions in the armed forces, passed and made effective in 1960, provides for annual leave for all members of the armed forces and overhauls the noncommissioned officer grade structure; these changes are designed to provide more incentive for qualified NCO's to remain in service. Recent changes have eliminated most of the Soviet characteristics in military apparel, and the uniform is now more in the Czech tradition. Although these measures helped to create pride in the service and have had some impact on raising morale of the troops, there has been a definite lack of leadership during the postinvasion period, particularly among junior officers and NCO's. In an attempt to overcome this weakness, a system of cash incentives was initiated in 1970 for reservists and young volunteers who would enter the career service. Morale ranges from good in the air force to fair for men in their basic 2-year term of service in the ground forces; military service never has been popular with the Czechoslovaks.

Building morale within the armed forces is complicated by the multinational composition of the country. Nationalism, which is usually considered a cohesive force within other Eastern European countries, tends to be divisive in Czechoslovakia. For the most part the Slovak minority within the armed forces does not react with fervor to Czech symbols and objectives. Instead there is some Slovak resentment of Czech preeminence, based largely on historical and socioeconomic factors. Political concessions and economic development in Slovakia appear to have reduced Slovak resentment, and the Soviet invasion and occupation of their lands has tended to have a unifying effect on the armed forces. There is no apparent organized resistance to the present regime among the military. The troops have lived under communism most of their lives and continue to receive intensive indoctrination. Although the armed forces are politically reliable with regard to the Czechoslovak regime, the 1968 invasion casts some doubts on their reliability as a Warsaw Pact force. The armed forces are capable, however, of effective military action.

4. Strength trends (S)

In the initial period following the Communist seizure of power in February 1948 the ground and air forces were allowed to deteriorate. Many of the more efficient officers and noncommissioned officers were purged and replaced by less skilled but more politically reliable individuals. By 1950, however, emphasis was being placed on reconstructing a fairly sizable and militarily effective force. A strength of 234,000 was reached in mid-1953 after a buildup because of the strained world situation and the Korean conflict. The ground forces strength leveled off by 1954 and remained fairly constant at an estimated 170,000 men until 1961 (Figure 2). By the end of 1961 the ground forces were expanded to 220,000 in response to the Berlin crisis. This strength was maintained by increased reserve induction and early callus of some conscripts. By mid-1962 the ground forces strength was reduced to 200,000, and, after 1965, estimates indicated ground forces strength to be approximately 175,000. In January 1974 these forces were estimated to number 143,000.

The strength of the air force has continued to grow since 1955. Only the period following the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 showed a decline of air force personnel. Total air force personnel in the air and air defense system now stands at about 32,100.

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110009-4