Page:Mr. John Stuart Mill and the ballot.djvu/12

10 Moreover, the analogy between representative and voter is imperfect: if the former do not satisfy his constituents, he probably loses their support at future elections; the only influence that can be used against the voter is intimidation or coercion. Would special interests or class questions be more or less likely to have due weight if the operation of all undue influences were withdrawn?

It is no doubt true that all who are fit to influence electors are not fit for that reason to be electors; and hence it may safely be assumed that they will in all probability seek their ends by undue influence. A combination of working men may as effectually ruin a tradesman as a single wealthy customer; such combinations have frequently been threatened and have sometimes been put into actual practice. They are very likely to be employed under the system of open voting, but with the ballot would be impossible. Non-electors would then be compelled to rely upon arguments instead of threats, and it is almost certain that they would more readily attain their ends whenever those ends were right and just.

Mr. Mill makes a great mistake in supposing that "public opinion" exercises its due influence by means of open voting. The direct contrary is, we believe, the fact, open voting being a most powerful instrument in opposition to the due influence of public opinion. It may bring a steadying influence to work against pressure: those, however, who work against the pressure of public opinion are the few who steadily set themselves to convert the public from an erroneous to a sound opinion. Under any circumstances, under any constituency and form of voting their work would be the same; and, unless we are very much mistaken,