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2 )? We hold, in accord with the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, that §630(b)’s two-sentence delineation, and the expression “also means” at the start of the second sentence, combine to establish separate categories: persons engaged in an industry affecting commerce with 20 or more employees; and States or political subdivisions with no attendant numerosity limitation. “[T]wenty or more employees” is confining language, but the confinement is tied to §630(b)’s first sentence, and does not limit the ADEA’s governance of the employment practices of States and political subdivisions thereof.

Initially, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §2000e et seq., which prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin, applied solely to private sector employers. The same was true of the ADEA, enacted three years later to protect workers against “arbitrary age discrimination.” 29 U. S. C. §621(b). As originally enacted, both Title VII and the ADEA imposed liability on “employer[s],” defined in both statutes to include “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce” whose employees met a numerical threshold, but specifically to exclude governmental entities. 78 Stat. 253 (Title VII); 81 Stat. 605 (ADEA).

In 1972, Congress amended Title VII to reach state and local employers. Under the revised provision of Title VII, “[t]he term ‘person’ includes one or more individuals, governments, governmental agencies, [and] political subdivisions,” also certain other specified entities, and “[t]he term ‘employer’ means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees….” 42 U. S. C. §2000e(a)–(b). For this purpose, amended Title VII defines “industry affecting commerce” to “includ[e] any governmental industry, business, or activity.”