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 4. A very probable opinion of long standing in England maintains that merely positive laws are penal, and do not bind under sin except to submit to the penalty in case of violation, and if it be imposed. Of course, it is [well that all subjects should loyally obey all the just laws of their country, and good citizens will make a point of doing so; but in moral theology we are concerned with the question of sin, and it is probable that one who violates a positive law of England does not commit sin thereby if he be prepared to submit to the penalty, if imposed. This is the teaching of Blackstone, and although other views concerning legal obligation have become fashionable since he wrote, his opinion would seem not to be materially affected thereby. According to Austin, the chance of incurring the evil imposed by the legislator on those who transgress his laws is the only possible obligation of law a doctrine which would make all laws penal, and nothing else but penal. The idealist school does not accept Austin's views, but its only conception of moral obligation is that it is self-imposed; it denies that moral obligation is or can be imposed by a legislator. It is true that if the legislator wished to impose a strict and perfect obligation by positive law, the subject would be bound under sin to conform to it, but the English legislature cannot be said to do this, as the common opinion in the country, on one ground or another, is that a moral obligation under pain of sin is not imposed by positive law.

5. The effect of voiding laws in English jurisprudence seems to be not to invalidate an act or a contract which is otherwise valid, but to empower the party concerned to annul it if he choose to take advantage of the law. Unless the party concerned move in the matter, the act struck at by a voiding law will remain valid. This seems to be the view which lawyers take of the effect of such laws; it is in keeping, too, with a very prevalent theological opinion concerning the nature of voiding laws in modern jurisprudence.

i. A privilege is, as it were, a private law which grants a special favour to some person.

It is a law, because although as a general rule no one is bound to use a privilege, since what is granted as a favour