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1. A law should further the common good; if it ceases to do this, it becomes useless, and ceases to be a law. A law then ceases to bind when it ceases to be useful for the object for which it was made. However, it not unfrequently happens that a law was designed to further several objects, and it may well be that, though it is useless for one purpose, it is of use for another. The law which requires banns to be published before marriage is designed to discover impediments if there be any, and also to secure the publicity of marriage. It may be absolutely certain that there are no impediments, but for all that the other object of the law, remains to be secured, and prevents the law from being useless. The law remains in force as long as it serves its purpose to some extent, though it may not attain all the objects for which it was made.

2. A positive law ceases to be of obligation in a particular case if it becomes hurtful, or if it cannot be observed without serious inconvenience. But does a law cease to bind in a particular case when it becomes merely useless, when it fails in that particular case to attain any of the objects for which it was made? This question is disputed among theologians. The better and more common opinion is that the law does not then cease to bind. For the law is made for the community, and if it continues to promote the common good it retains its binding force for the community. Nor can individuals shake off the obligation of such a law on the ground that it is useless for them; they are bound to conform their actions to the rules which govern the community of which they are members. Besides, there is always danger of selfdeception in such matters, and it would be a dangerous principle to admit that one who thinks that a law is useless as a guide for his own conduct need not obey the law. If, however, there be no danger of self-deception, and if it is quite certain that a law has ceased to be of any use in some special case, several theologians of weight admit the probability of the contrary opinion.

Canon 21 enacts that laws made to guard against a general danger continue to bind even though the danger may not exist in a particular case.