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 together to pass an unjust law are jointly and severally bound to make reparation for all the harm that the law does. Jurymen, too, whose vote is necessary for an unjust verdict are all responsible for the injustice if they give the verdict. Sometimes, however, when injury is inflicted by the unjust votes of many, the obligation of making restitution will depend on the manner of voting. If all acted conjointly, giving their votes in a body, each and all will be responsible for the harm done; if, however, the voting took place successively, those who voted first and whose votes were necessary and sufficient for passing the unjust measure will indeed be bound to make restitution; but those who voted subsequently, and whose votes were not required to make the measure law, may be excused from the obligation of making reparation except in the case of conspiracy, though they, too, sin against justice. Those who give an unjust vote when it is the only means of preventing a greater evil do not do wrong, and are not bound to make restitution. When one of two evils is necessary, we may lawfully choose the less.

4. Whoever by provocation or ridicule, or by praise or flattery, causes another to commit an injury, or is the cause why reparation is not made for injustice committed, is himself bound to make restitution in the same way as one who is the cause of injustice by counsel.

5. One may be a partner in the infliction of injuries in various ways. He who helps another to perform an unjust action is a partner in injustice in the strict sense. One, however, who receives stolen goods or affords protection to a wrongdoer, and so encourages him in committing injustice, is also a partner in his sin. A receiver of stolen goods is obviously bound to restore them to their owner, and if by holding himself out as ready to receive them, or by affording protection to the thief, he is the cause of injustice being committed, he will be responsible for that too. To what extent the partner in injustice is bound to make restitution will depend on circumstances. He will be responsible for the whole damage inflicted if it could not have been inflicted without his help, or if the partners conspired together to commit injustice. Otherwise it will be sufficient to make reparation for such part of the damage as each respectively caused, in the estimation of a prudent person.

When treating of charity we saw that it was never lawful to co-operate formally in another's sin, but that according to the principle of a double effect it is sometimes allowed to co-operate