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 maliciously, but also when they gave injurious advice through gravely culpable ignorance or precipitancy. Others who do not specially hold themselves out as experts will not be bound to compensate those who ask their advice and suffer loss through following it. No injury was done by giving them what they asked for, no fraud was committed by the assumption of skill or knowledge which was not possessed; if they chose to follow the advice, they took the risk on themselves, and ''scienti et volenti nonfit injuria.

He who follows unjust advice acts in his own behalf and in his own name, and so is the principal cause of the injury done. He is bound in the first place to make restitution, and if he fail to do so, the counsellor is bound.

2. We co-operate in injustice by command when by whatever means we induce another to do an injury in our name and on our behalf. It does not matter whether one of the parties is in a position of superiority with respect to the other or not, nor by what means he induces the other to perform the injurious action, whether by threats, or promises, or commands, or requests; it is sufficient if by any means he induces the other to do his unjust will. Henry II made himself guilty of the blood of St Thomas a Becket by complaining that none who ate his bread would avenge the insults offered him. Mere approval, however, of injustice which has already been done does not render him who approves liable to make restitution.

One who by command induces another to commit an injury is bound in the first place to make reparation for the injury and for all the damage which was the necessary consequence. In his default the instrument of his injustice is bound to make restitution. The one who gave the command is not bound to compensate his agent for loss or damage which he suffers in executing the will of his principal, unless compulsion or other unjust means were used to procure his co-operation. Nor is he bound to make restitution for damage which his agent did in excess of the instructions given. Furthermore, if before the command is executed he recalls it and the recall is notified to the agent, he will not be responsible for what the agent may do on his own authority; he will be responsible, however, if by any chance the intimation that the command is recalled does not reach the agent.

3. One who co-operates in injustice by giving his consent or vote that the unjust action should be done is bound to make reparation if his consent was the moral cause of the injustice. And so members of legislative bodies who agree