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20 to make the laws.” ''State ex rel. Schrader v. Polley'', 26 S. D. 5, 10–11, 127 N. W. 848, 850–851 (1910).

If these premises hold, then petitioners’ conclusion follows: In prescribing the times, places, and manner of congressional elections, “the lawmaking body or power of the state, as established by the state Constitution,” id., at 10, 127 N. W., at 850, performs “a federal function derived from the Federal Constitution,” which thus “transcends any limitations sought to be imposed by the people of a State,” Leser, 258 U. S., at 137. As shown, each premise is easily supported and consistent with this Court’s precedents. Petitioners’ conclusion also mirrors the Court’s interpretation of parallel language in the Electors Clause in McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 1 (1892): “[T]he words, ‘in such manner as the legislature thereof may direct,’ ” “operat[e] as a limitation upon the State in respect of any attempt to circumscribe the legislative power.” Id., at 25.

The majority rejects petitioners’ conclusion, but seemingly without rejecting any of the premises from which that conclusion follows. Its apparent rationale—that Hildebrant, Smiley, and Arizona State Legislature have already foreclosed petitioners’ argument—is untenable, as it requires disregarding a principled distinction between the issues in those cases and the question presented here. In those cases, the relevant state-constitutional provisions addressed the allocation of lawmaking power within each