Page:Moore v. Harper.pdf/57

Rh To be sure, the precise constitutional significance of the word “Legislature” depends on “the function to be performed” under the provision in question. Smiley, 285 U. S., at 365. Because “the function contemplated by” the Elections Clause “is that of making laws,” id., at 366, this Court’s Elections Clause cases have consistently looked to a State’s written constitution to determine the constitutional actors in whom lawmaking power is vested. See Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U. S. 787, 795–796, 814 (2015); Smiley, 285 U. S., at 363; Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U. S. 565, 566–568 (1916). The definitions that most precisely explain this Court’s holdings were given in a state-court case that anticipated Hildebrant and Smiley by several years: “[T]he word ‘Legislature,’ as used in [the Elections Clause] means the lawmaking body or power of the state, as established by the state Constitution,” or, put differently, “that body of persons within a state clothed with authority