Page:Moore v. Harper.pdf/53

Rh And the idea that we could still decide petitioners’ moot federal defense because it could “alter the presently operative statutes of North Carolina”—even if it cannot affect the ultimate judgment in this action—is wholly foreign to Article III. (internal quotation marks omitted).

In that light, the post-Harper I remedial Act and its “trigger provisio[n]” plainly can make no difference to our jurisdiction or lack thereof. When passed, that Act was essentially a change in the State’s conduct under judicial constraint (the result of Harper I), but with the declared intention of resuming the original conduct if that constraint were removed. That declaration kept the controversy alive while the constraint still existed, as in Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U. S. 541, 545, n. 1 (1999). But, after Harper III, there is no more constraint in this case. Harper I has been overruled, and plaintiffs-respondents’ claims have been dismissed in a final judgment. Nothing about this case prevents the State from either enacting or implementing any districting plan. If “the presently operative statutes of North Carolina” need to be “alter[ed],” that is the General Assembly’s job, not ours. (internal quotation marks omitted). Regardless, petitioners have fully prevailed in this case, and plaintiffs-respondents have not obtained any enforceable relief that could affect the conduct of future elections.

Indeed, to the extent the trigger provision adds anything to the majority’s analysis, it only underscores the absence of a justiciable case or controversy. A state legislature is