Page:Moore v. Harper.pdf/52

14 and Harper I was no exception. Nor did Harper III, despite agreeing with petitioners in all other respects, anywhere endorse their belief that some “order striking down the 2021 [Act]” would survive a decision overruling Harper I and dismissing this lawsuit with prejudice. (internal quotation marks omitted). To the extent that the majority imputes that idea to Harper III, it again seriously misreads that decision. See. The majority states that Harper III “did not reinstate the 2021 congressional pla[n] that Harper I had struck down.” (citing Harper III, ___ N. C., at ___–___, 886 S. E. 2d, at 446–448). But the part of Harper III that the majority cites had nothing to do with North Carolina’s congressional plan. Instead, it considered whether two state-constitutional provisions, which require that state-legislature districting plans “remain unaltered” until the next census after they have become “established,” N. C. Const., Art. II, §§3(4) and 5(4), prevented the Assembly from revising the 2021 state plans that Harper I had rejected. See Harper III, ___ N. C., at ___–___, 886 S. E. 2d, at 446–448. In determining that the 2021 state plans were never “established,” Harper III did not mean that Harper I somehow still restrains those plans; rather, it indicated that those plans themselves do not restrain the Assembly going forward. Absolutely nothing in Harper III suggests that the North Carolina Supreme Court’s judgments act directly upon legislative enactments—“striking them down” today and “reinstating” them tomorrow—or that the 2021 congressional map remains subject to any restraint left over from Harper I.

Even if it were, we would still have no case or controversy in front of us. A freestanding “judgment” of statutory invalidation—neutralizing the 2021 Act in some manner transcending the final determination of the parties’ respective rights in this case—would not be a judicial action within the meaning of Article III, and it could not be reviewed in this Court. See Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U. S. 210, 226–227 (1908). “We sit as a court of law, not a council of revision,” and “[o]ur powers of judicial review are judicial, not legislative, in nature.” Mackey, 401 U. S., at 697 (opinion of Harlan, J.). The only power that we ever could have exercised here was to modify the adjudicated rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to the claims in this action. Because we plainly cannot do so, no matter what we think about the Elections Clause, this proceeding is moot.