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Rh premise of judicial review itself. “[A]n unconstitutional provision is never really part of the body of governing law,” for “the Constitution automatically displaces [it] from the moment of [its] enactment.” Collins v. Yellen, 594 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (slip op., at 35) (emphasis added). Thus, when a court holds a statute unconstitutional, it is emphatically not depriving it of any legal force that it previously possessed as an Act. The court is only deciding “a particular case” “conformably to the constitution, disregarding” a statute that cannot “govern the case” because it is already “void.” Marbury, 1 Cranch, at 178; accord, Bayard v. Singleton, 1 N. C. 5, 7 (1787) (holding that the unconstitutional “act on which [a party’s] motion was grounded … must of course, in that instance, stand as abrogated and without any effect”). “That is the classic explanation for the basis of judicial review” set forth in Marbury and Bayard, and it remains “from that day to this the sole continuing rationale for the exercise of this judicial power.” Mackey v. United States, 401 U. S. 667, 678 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).

The majority’s theory thus fails twice over, both as a description of Harper I’s “judgment” and as an explanation of how any justiciable controversy could exist in this Court. The only power that the North Carolina courts exercised at any stage of this case was that of “determin[ing] the respective rights and liabilities or duties of litigants in [the] controversy” before them. Nicholson, 275 N. C., at 447, 168 S. E. 2d, at 406. Harper I’s judgment line did not read: “Stricken down,” referring to the 2021 Act, but instead: “Reversed and remanded,” referring to the lower court judgment and the case between these parties. 380 N. C., at 404, 868 S. E. 2d, at 560 (some capitalization deleted). The judicial power operates upon parties and cases, not statutes,