Page:Moore v. Harper.pdf/46

8 facts about the procedural history of this case and misapplies civil-procedure rules as if Harper I and Harper III did not involve the same case. But the error that actually drives the majority’s conclusion is much deeper. The majority evidently thinks that when Harper I held the 2021 Act unconstitutional, it entered a “judgment” affecting the 2021 Act as a statute, independent of its application to the legal rights of the litigants in this case. And the majority thinks that to reverse Harper I’s “judgment” would “negate the force of its order striking down” the Act, thus “alter[ing] the presently operative statutes of North Carolina.” (internal quotation marks omitted). But, of course, the judicial power does not “operate on legal rules in the abstract”; it operates on the rights and liabilities of contending parties with adverse legal interests. California v. Texas, 593 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (slip op., at 8) (internal quotation marks omitted). The majority’s reasoning cannot be squared with the judicial power vested by the Constitution the case-or-controversy requirement, or the nature of judicial review.

I start by clearing away some of the brush. True, Harper III did not expressly “revisit” the Elections Clause issue, ; true as well, petitioners did not obtain rehearing of Harper I, see. But none of that matters because Harper III’s final judgment mooted the Elections Clause issue in this case by dismissing plaintiffs-respondents’ claims on alternative state-law grounds. Likewise, the idea that