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Rh conducting elections in accord with the Act. They based their claim for relief on the North Carolina Constitution, which they argued prohibits excessive partisan gerrymanders.

Petitioners, state legislators representing North Carolina’s interest in the enforcement of the Act, see N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. §1–72.2 (2021); Berger v. North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP, 597 U. S. ___, ___, ___–___ (2022) (slip op., at 2, 8–9), raised defenses under both state and federal law. As relevant here, they argued: (1) that partisan-gerrymandering claims are not justiciable under the North Carolina Constitution; and (2) that the State Constitution cannot restrict the General Assembly’s congressional districting legislation under the federal Elections Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, §4, cl. 1.

Initially, a three-judge trial court endorsed petitioners’ state-law defense and entered a final judgment dismissing plaintiffs-respondents’ claims with prejudice. But, on appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed that judgment. See Harper v. Hall, 380 N. C. 317, 868 S. E. 2d 499 (2022) (Harper I). In Harper I, the court held that the 2021 Act violated the State Constitution, enjoined its implementation, and remanded the case to the trial court for remedial proceedings. In doing so, Harper I rejected both petitioners’ state-law justiciability defense and their federal Elections Clause defense.

Petitioners then sought this Court’s review of Harper I insofar as it rejected their federal defense. From the start, they faced a significant jurisdictional question. Our