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Rh this area are complex and context specific. We hold only that state courts may not transgress the ordinary bounds of judicial review such that they arrogate to themselves the power vested in state legislatures to regulate federal elections.

We decline to address whether the North Carolina Supreme Court strayed beyond the limits derived from the Elections Clause. The legislative defendants did not meaningfully present the issue in their petition for certiorari or in their briefing, nor did they press the matter at oral argument. See Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U. S. 192, 206–208 (1997); see also California v. Texas, 593 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (slip op., at 10). Counsel for the defendants expressly disclaimed the argument that this Court should reassess the North Carolina Supreme Court’s reading of state law. Tr. of Oral Arg. 7 (“We’re not asking this Court to second-guess or reassess. We say take the North Carolina Supreme Court’s decision on face value and as fairly reflecting North Carolina law….”). When pressed whether North Carolina’s Supreme Court did not fairly interpret its State Constitution, counsel reiterated that such an argument was “not our position in this Court.” Id., at 54. Although counsel attempted to expand the scope of the argument in rebuttal, such belated efforts do not overcome prior failures to preserve the issue for review. See this Court’s Rule 28 (“[C]ounsel making the opening argument shall present the case fairly and completely and not reserve points of substance for rebuttal.”).

State courts retain the authority to apply state constitutional restraints when legislatures act under the power conferred upon them by the Elections Clause. But federal