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26 closely parallel. And around the time the Articles were adopted by the Second Continental Congress, multiple States regulated the “manner” of “appoint[ing] delegates,” ibid., suggesting that the Framers did not understand that language to insulate state legislative action from state constitutional provisions. See Del. Const., Art. XI (1776); Md. Const., Art. XXVII (1776); Va. Const., cls. 3–4 (1776); Pa. Const., §11 (1776); N. C. Const., Art. XXXVII (1776); Ga. Const., Art. XVI (1777); N. Y. Const., Art. XXX (1777); S. C. Const., Art. XXII (1778); Mass. Const., pt. 2, ch. IV (1780); N. H. Const., pt. II (1784).

The defendants stress an 1820 convention held in Massachusetts to amend the Commonwealth’s Constitution. After a Boston delegate proposed a provision regulating the manner of federal elections, Joseph Story—then a Justice of this Court—nixed the effort. In Story’s view, such a provision would run afoul of the Elections Clause by “assum[ing] a control over the Legislature, which the constitution of the United States does not justify.” Journal of the Debates and Proceedings in the Convention of Delegates 110 (1853). But Story’s comment elicited little discussion, and reflects the views of a jurist who, although “a brilliant and accomplished man, … was not a member of the Founding generation.” U. S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U. S. 779, 856 (1995) (, dissenting).

Although we conclude that the Elections Clause does not exempt state legislatures from the ordinary constraints imposed by state law, state courts do not have free rein. “State courts are the appropriate tribunals … for the decision of questions arising under their local law, whether statutory or otherwise.” Murdock v. Memphis, 20 Wall. 590, 626 (1875). At the same time, the Elections Clause expressly vests power to carry out its provisions in “the Legislature”