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10 that the North Carolina Supreme Court has now dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice. He posits, therefore, that the legislative defendants “are not injured by the judgment of Harper I.” (dissenting opinion). But the record before us belies that notion. Harper I enjoined the use of the 2021 maps in subsequent elections in North Carolina. Well after the time for seeking rehearing as to that judgment passed, the legislative defendants instead sought rehearing with respect to Harper II, a distinct decision concerning remedies. The defendants steadfastly maintained in rehearing proceedings before the North Carolina Supreme Court that “overruling Harper I [would] not negate the force of its order striking down the 2021 plans.” Pet. for Rehearing 24; see also Legislative Defendants’ Supp. Brief on Rehearing in Harper v. Hall, No. 413PA21–2, p. 56 (N. C., Feb. 17, 2023) (“[T]he Court’s dictate that the 2021 plans may not be used ‘in any future elections’ would not be vacated.”). With those concessions on the record, the North Carolina Supreme Court issued its decision “overruling” Harper I, and—by contrast—“withdraw[ing]” its decision in Harper II. Harper, ___ N. C., at ___, 886 S. E. 2d, at 449. And mirroring their representations before the North Carolina Supreme Court, the legislative defendants now maintain in this Court that they continue to remain bound by the judgment in Harper I.

In an effort to cast doubt on these consistent representations by the injured party before us, contends that the legislative defendants have already received complete relief because nothing now prevents the implementation of the 2021 maps. (dissenting opinion). For the reasons stated above, that would come as a surprise to both the legislative defendants and the North Carolina Supreme Court. The dissent also emphasizes that several of the plaintiffs contest our jurisdiction. But that has been their position from the very beginning,