Page:Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Anderson.pdf/3

Rh   Court held that the rule required exclusion of evidence of the partial forgiveness of a debt for medical services rendered to the plaintiff. The defendant moved for a new trial pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(8), arguing that the ruling was an error of law that prevented it from having a fair trial. The Trial Court denied the motion, and we affirm.

On November 14, 1994, appellee Shirley Anderson was badly injured in a fall while shopping in appellant's Montgomery Ward store in Little Rock. Montgomery Ward personnel sent her to the hospital at the University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences ("UAMS") to be treated. Ms. Anderson had surgical and other medical-services expenses at UAMS totaling $24,512.45. Montgomery Ward moved in limine to prohibit Ms. Anderson from presenting the total amount billed by UAMS as proof of her medical expenses and asked that her evidence be limited to the actualamount for which she would be responsible to pay. In response, Ms. Anderson stated that, through her attorney, she had reached an agreement with UAMS that UAMS would discount the bill by fifty per cent. Ms. Anderson asserted that the collateral-source rule would prohibit Montgomery Ward from introducing evidence of the discount.

The Trial Court denied the motion in limine, ruling that the negotiated discount with UAMS was a collateral source, and allowed evidence of the entire amount billed by UAMS. Montgomery Ward urges that the ruling and the denial of the motion for new trial made on the same basis were erroneous.

[1, 2] The decision to grant or deny a new trial under Rule 59(a)(8) is within the discretion of the trial court, and that decision is not reversed absent a manifest abuse of discretion, that is, discretion exercised thoughtlessly and without due consideration. Nazarenko v. CTI Trucking Co., Inc., 313 Ark. 570, 856S.W.2d 869 (1993). See also Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Priddy, 328 Ark. 666, 945 S.W.2d 355 (1997); Drope v. Owens, 298 Ark. 69, 765 S.W.2d 8 (1989). Similarly, a trial court's ruling on the admission or exclusion of evidence will not be reversed absent abuse of discretion. See Ark. R. Evid. 104(a); Esry v. Carden, 328 Ark. 153, 942 S.W.2d 846 (1997).