Page:Montesquieu - The spirit of laws.djvu/365

Rh who collects his own rents himself with œconomy and order.

By the administration of the revenues the prince is at liberty to press or to retard the levy of the taxes, either according to his own wants, or to those of his people. By this he saves to the state the immense profits of the farmers, who impoverish it a thousand ways. By this he spares the people the mortifying fight of sudden fortunes. By this the money collected passes through few hands, goes directly to the treasury, and consequently makes a quicker return to the people. By this the prince avoids an infinite number of bad laws extorted from him continually by the importunate avarice of the farmers, who pretend to offer a present advantage for regulations pernicious to posterity.

As the moneyed man is always the most powerful, the farmer renders himself arbitrary even over the prince himself; he is not the legislator, but he obliges the legislator to give laws.

In republics, the revenues of the state are generally under administration. The contrary practice was a great defect in the Roman government. In despotic governments, the people are infinitely happier where this administration is established; witness Persia and China. The unhappiest of all are those where the prince farms out his sea ports and trading cities. The history of monarchies Rh