Page:Montesquieu - The spirit of laws.djvu/216

164 when this is the case there can no longer be any virtue either in the governours, or the governed.

If the reigning families observe the laws, it is a monarchy with several monarchs, and in its own nature one of the mod excellent; for almost all these monarchs are tied down by the laws. But when they do not observe them, it is a despotic state governed by a great many despotic princes.

In this last case the republic consists only in the nobles. The body governing is the republic; and the body governed is the despotic state; which forms two of the most heterogeneous and divided bodies in the world.

The extremity of corruption is when the power of the nobles becomes hereditary ; for then they can hardly have any moderation. If they are few in number, their power is greater, but their security less; if they are a larger number, their power is less, and their security greater: insomuch that power goes on increasing, and security diminishing, up to the very despotic prince whose head is encircled with excels of power and danger.

The great number therefore of nobles in an hereditary aristocracy renders the government less violent: but as there is less virtue, they fall into a spirit of supineness and negligence, by which means the state loses all its strength and activity.

An aristocracy may maintain the full vigor of its constitution, if the laws be such as are apt to render the nobles more sensible of the perils and fatigues, than of the pleasure of command; and if Rh