Page:Montesquieu - The spirit of laws.djvu/152

100 to this magistracy the military command of which it had been formerly possessed; unless indeed he had very particular reasons for so doing. A person that aspires to the sovereignty, concerns himself lets about what is serviceable to the state, than about what is likely to promote his own interest.

Fourthly it is a question, whether public employments should be venal? They ought not, I think, in despotic governments, where the subjects must be instantaneously placed or displaced by the prince.

But in monarchies this venality is not at all improper, by reason it is an inducement to undertake that as a family employment, which would never be undertaken through a motive of virtue; it fixes likewise every one to his duty, and renders the several orders of the kingdom more permanent. Suidas very justly observes that Anastasius had changed the empire into a kind of aristocracy, by selling all public employments.

Plato cannot bear with this venality. "This is exactly, says he, as if a person was to be made a mariner or pilot of a ship for his money. Is it possible that this rule should be bad in every other employment of life, and bold good only in administration of a republic?" But Plato speaks of a republic founded on virtue, and we of a monarchy. Now in monarchies (where though there were no such thing as a regular sale of public offices, still the indigence and avidity of the courtier would equally prompt him to expose them to sale) chance will furnish better subjects than the prince's choice. In fine, the method of Rh