Page:Montesquieu - The spirit of laws.djvu/140

88 In countries where there are no fundamental laws, the succession to the empire cannot be fixed. The crown is then elective, and the right of electing is in the prince, who names a successor either of his own or of some other family. In vain would it be to establish here the succession of the eldest son; the prince might always chuse another. The successor is declared by the prince himself, or by a civil war. Hence a despotic state is, upon another account, more liable than a monarchical government to dissolution.

As every prince of the royal family is held equally capable of being chosen, hence it follows that the prince who ascends the throne, strangles immediately his brothers, as in Turky; or puts out their eyes, as in Persia; or bereaves them of their understanding, as in the Mogul's country; or if these precautions are not used, as in Morocco, the vacancy of the throne is always attended with a horrid civil war.

By the constitutions of Russia the Czar may chuse who he has a mind for his successor, whether of his own or of a strange family. Such a settlement produces a thousand revolutions, and renders the throne as tottering as the succession is arbitrary.

The right of succession being one of those things which are of most importance to the people to know; the best is that which most sensibly strikes them, such as a certain order of birth.

A settlement of this kind puts a stop to intrigues, and stifles ambition; the mind of a weak prince is no longer inslaved, nor is he made to speak his will as he is just expiring.

When the succession is established by a fundamental law, only one prince is the successor, and his brothers have neither a real nor apparent right to Rh