Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 9.djvu/88

 76 AETHUR JAMES BALFOUB. From these propositions it follows that the world of objects, the system of Nature, the context of experience, is produced by, and is dependent on, a self-conscious intelligence which, from the very fact that it is the condi- tion of there being phenomena, cannot itself be a phenomenon, but must, as a " free cause," stand outside the universe of space and time which it constitutes an intelligible unity. Since no one pretends that the universe is conterminous with the limited number of objects which he or his neighbours distinguish from their self- conscious selves, or is necessarily constituted by the relations under which he or they perceive it, it must follow that there is a single self-conscious intelligence to which the whole universe is relative, and of which all other self-conscious intelligences are a partial " mode" or " manifestation ". The metaphysical system, of which these propositions may be said in a general way to form the skeleton, is evidently a species of simplified Kantism ; Kantism purged of " thiiigs- in-themselves " and denuded of the complicated architec- tonic structure with which its first author encumbered it. But while the avowed outcome of the Critick of Pure Reason was to show that a scientific knowledge of phenomena, but of phenomena alone, is possible, Green's " Metaphysics of Knowledge" professes to demonstrate the existence of indi- vidual self-conscious spirits outside the realm of phenomena altogether, and of one universal self-conscious spirit through which alone the world of phenomena exists, and of which all other intelligences are the imperfect manifestations. If his system is simpler than that of his master it is therefore much less negative in its speculative results. Now it must be evident, I think, to anyone who has read the foregoing summary of Green's doctrine, and still more evident to anyone who has glanced at his writings, that the whole fabric of his philosophy rests on his theory of rela- tions ; and that his theory of relations consists mainly of these two propositions : first, that objects are constituted by relations ; J3j3c_ojid]y, that relations are the work of the mind. In defence of the first of these assertions Green chiefly concerns himself with refuting what he conceived to be the alternative theory, that, namely, according to which the reality of objects consists in, or at least is represented by, unrelated simple sensations. With this theory, which Green attributes to Locke and to the whole empirical school whose philosophical pedigree may be traced to Locke, I have nothing to do. Those who hold it may be left to defend it. But in Green's own view there appears to be a difficulty which he has himself pointed out (pp. 45 ff.) with his usual force and fairness, but of which the statement appears to me to be more successful than the reply. The difficulty is this. If the world of experience consists solely of relations, what are these relations between ? Let it be conceded for