Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 9.djvu/603

 A. FOUILLEE'S SYSTEJIES DE MORALE coyiEiiPORAixs. 591 " independent " ethics of Vacherot, again, takes duty which implies liberty as its fixed point ; but although this school discards metaphysics, both duty and liberty are metaphysical notions. The " semi-Kantism " of M. Renouvier, it is argued hi Book iii., can obtain no support without returning to Kantian ethics pure and simple. In the following Book, Kant's ethical writings are subjected to a detailed examination, in which it is argued that he takes the whole question for granted, that he never shows that pure reason is practical, but introduces into his ethics the dogmatism his criticism of metaphysics had discredited : " Everyone has remarked that there is a change of view between the two Criticte ; but this change is much more extensive and im- portant than ordinarily believed " (p. 129). The succeeding Books discuss the pessimism of Schopenhauer and Hartmann, " spiritualist " ethics, chiefly as represented by M. Janet, aesthetic and mystic ethics, and the theological ethics of M. Secretan. It would require too much space to discuss fully the way in which the author deals with these different subjects ; and I shall therefore confine myself to one or two critical remarks. On the whole, it seems to me that M. Fouillee's book, while abounding in acute criticism, is not always successful in keeping the funda- mental notions of a system well in view, while the moral theory ultimately arrived at, by which other systems are to be supple- mented or superseded, bears traces of having been adopted some- what hastily. The vigorous and in many points successful criticism of Kant's ethics, is yet wanting in a true estimate of the relation between his speculative and practical criticisms. By represent- ing this throughout as a parallelism, it is easy enough to make the conclusions of the two Cnticks look opposed and arbitrary. But the Critick of Practical R^ison rests upon the ideas ultimately found to be involved in speculative reason. If experience implies ideals of reason which cannot be contained by the categories of discursive thought, M. Fouillee's question (p. 130) If experience reigns in the domain of knowledge why not also in that of action? is no longer unanswerable. For the same reason it is seen to be misleading to say that "in the sphere of speculation, pure reason is prisoner at the bar and experience the prosecutor ; in the sphere of practice all is changed : empiricism is the accused and pure reason the accuser" (p. 131). Again, when M. Fouillee says, speaking of Schopenhauer (p. 246), " On the one hand, he has not ridicule enough for the Kantian idea of duty; on the other hand, he cannot sufficiently admire the Kantian theory of liberty, yet this has neither value nor even sense apart from the idea of duty," neither Kant nor Schopenhauer is quite fairly dealt with. True, it is duty or the moral law that, with Kant, at once certifies to freedom and gives scope for it ; but free causality has meaning and even regulative value for him, apart