Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 9.djvu/567

 SEPAEATION OF QUESTIONS IN PHILOSOPHY. 555 characteristic is, that here we have unselfishness or self-sacrifice displayed, and, where unselfishness is wanting, we have not Virtue. Had this been observed, it would have spared us the indiscriminate mixing up of virtue, moral rectitude and duty that disfigures the Dissertation, and it would also have given additional point to the discussion about the Moral Faculty. Similarly, apart from clearness as to the notion, no definite result can ever be reached as to the competence of Virtue to stand for the ultimate ethical end. So long as leading terms like Duty, Obligation, Virtue are undifferentiated, dispute must needs be interminable ; it is only when a sharp and consistent separa- tion is made that a positive and definite conclusion can be looked for. After the determination of content may be taken up the question of origin ; and this, like the other, must be argued on its own independent basis. Here too emerges the question of ity, and it is legitimate to inquire how our view of the one affects our view of the other. One thing, however, is altogether illegitimate, and that is, to take for granted that an experiential origin is ipso facto derogatory, and that " derivative " and " de- graded " are in this connexion synonymous terms. A step further, and we are confronted by the relation between Virtue and Knowledge. This we isolate, not simply because of the historical importance of the question (dating as it does from Socrates), but also, and more especially, because of its great sig- nificance as bearing on life and practice. The question itself, however, assumes a variety of aspects, according to the meaning we attach to " knowledge " and to " relation ". Is the knowledge thought of identical with intellectual enlightenment ; or shall we restrict it to knowledge of the consequences of actions (effects on self, on others, or "on both) ; or does it signify consciousness of what, in any given situation, is the right course to pursue ; or is it to be taken as equivalent to wide experience and general culture? In none of these cases perhaps is it proper to say, without qualification, that "knowledge is virtue" 1 ; but in each case it can be shown that the connexion between virtue and knowledge is very intimate, and every aspect of it presses itself upon our notice. Again, we emphasise " relation," and we ask Is knowledge that which stimulates virtue when it is feeble ? 1 Perhaps it is worth observing that the Socratic dictum that " virtue is knowledge," or, as otherwise expressed in the Protagoras, that " no one errs willingly," is differently interpreted according as we view it in the light of "the choice of Hercules," or in the light of the teaching of certain other parts of the Memorabilia and of certain of the Platonic dialogues, or in the light of such a dialogue as the Phado. In the first case, it preaches pure Egoistic Hedonism ; in the second, it approaches the wider Utili- tarian doctrine ; in the third, it counsels contempt of the body and philo- sophic contemplation, leading naturally to mysticism in belief and to asceticism in practice.