Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 9.djvu/565

 SEPAKATION OF QUESTIONS IN PHILOSOPHY. 553 two have fundamental principles in common. But the Matter of the physicist is something external and independent, and an object of immediate cognition ; the external world of the idealist is neither external (in the abstract sense of that term) nor inde- pendent, and what we immediately cognise is states of conscious- ness. Therefore (it is argued), Empirical Science is here in con- tradiction of Experiential Philosophy; and the implication of course is so much the worse for Philosophy. The rejoinder is obvious enough. The realism of the physicist is precisely that of the practical man, and, if so, has no special bearing whatever on the philosophical position. Now it has been proved, and is generally admitted, that for practical purposes the realism of the plain man or of common sense is equally valid for realist and idealist alike. The attitude of the physicist, therefore, is neither more nor less inconsistent with that of the idealist than is the attitude of the plain man or of the idealist himself when he is dealing with practical affairs. The fallacy is at bottom this : Because the physicist and the experiential philosopher agree in method and in certain other respects, therefore they agree in everything. It is forgotten that the two have different ends in view ; and that this difference of end removes the point of the objection and explains the seeming opposition. If now we turn from Metaphysics to Ethics, we shall find examples abundant in all directions. We have an instance in the perpetual confusing of the ethical with the religious sanction, and another in the mixing up of the ideal of ethical doctrine with the doctrine as it actually exists, and still another in the ten- dency to ignore the discrimination between End and Motive. Yet, who that considers it does not see that ethics and religion are two separate things, and that ethics de facto is by no means identical with ethics de jure, while the end of an action is very far from being synonymous with the motive of it ? It is the " end " of conduct that gives us the test, standard or criterion of it and that determines its absolute value ; it is the " motive " that constitutes the moral sanction. It is one thing to ask, Do actions tend simply to the individual's good, or have they refer- ence to the general welfare ? Is self the centre and the measure of them, or do they go beyond self and embrace other selves ? Are they self-regarding or extra-regarding, interested or disin- terested, personal or benevolent, egoistic or altruistic ? It is quite another thing to inquire, Whether they are prompted by a regard for duty, or by desire of pleasure ? by fear of punishment or by longing for reward ? But, perhaps, as good a case as any is seen in the group of ques- tions that range themselves around the central ethical conception, Virtue. As with Cause, so here. First comes the determination of the notion, then the consideration of its origin. The difficulties attaching to the notion are somewhat peculiar, arising partly from the circumstance that virtue as an act must be distinguished from