Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 9.djvu/561

 SEPARATION OF QUESTIONS IN PHILOSOPHY. from one to the other, we shall maintain clearness in our reason- ing or involve ourselves in ambiguity and mist. A specimen of the prevalent confusion on this preliminary point may be found in the Free-will controversy. Much of the unsatisfactoriness that usually attaches to the conduct of the discussion may be explained by the circumstance that disputants on both sides take for granted that there is nothing equivocal in the leading question, " Are motives causes ? " whereas the issue greatly turns on the ambiguous word " Cause," and the answer (whether affirmative or negative) means one thing or another according as the term is interpreted in this way or in that. Thus, are we to understand by "cause" Mill's sum-total of conditions? Then, motive must be regarded as the icltolt of what at any particular moment determines choice, and the common distinction of external and internal motives (on which the diffi- culty really hinges) is seen at once to be fallacious and mis- leading, and the free-will puzzle itself becomes simplified to a great degree. Are we, on the other hand, to take the abstract and analytic view of cause ? are we to accept it as the synonym of efficiency or power ? Then, the distinction between external and internal motives between the prompting force of things without us and the nature, laws, and principles of the world within becomes indispensable, and the free-will problem can hardly be else than an enigma. Failure or success in the solution much depends upon the start we make, and the start is in great measure conditioned by our conception of causation. A cognate confusion is seen when cause is identified with " ground " or " reason " : a confusion most conspicuous in the case of beliefs. A man believes so and so, and, in justification, regards it as sufficient to adduce the cause of his belief to state how it originated, under what conditions it was produced. Yet the cause is one thing, the ground or reason is quite another. The latter is wholly rational, and commends itself to our de- liberate acceptance ; the former may be altogether irrational, and a knowledge of it may lead to the rejection of that which it originated. A cause explains, a reason ju.ytijien ; and we miss the point if we offer the one when the other is required. After import comes origin. We have now to settle, whether the conception is derived from volition, or whether we obtain it from experiences of succession; and, if this last, whether physical or psychical succession is the proper type. Eightly also may be raised the question, whether, if we derive the conception from mental experiences, it is legitimate to extend it to the outward world at all. But, while anthropomorphism may thus be dis- cussed indeed miut be discussed, if the issue is to be made at all definite, the problem must not so be stated as to convey the impression that it is possible for man to gain knowledge which stands out of all relation to himself. It is pure nonsense to in juire, What is Cause apart from, and unrelated to, the human