Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 9.djvu/556

 544 J. HUTCHISON STIRLING : simply seen to be necessary seen, that is, to be not possibly otherwise. The relation is such that, the moment it is under- stood, the intellectual result is intellectually perceived. I say intellectually perceived, or intellectually seen. That anything should be sensuously perceived, sensuously seen, guarantees the existence of that thing as a fact, but it is no guarantee of necessity in any respect. / That element, neces- sity, is an article of intellectual and not of sensuous percep- tion. In regard to 2 and 2 being 4, for example, or 3 fives 15, if I were actually to take up each unit of the sum asserted to result in either case, and number these units just as they come one, two, three, four, &c. I should sensuously see, or sensuously perceive, the result just to be as announced. I should be able to say only, I have counted the units and I find their number to be what they are announced to be, but no more. If I were to add, " And, in effect, from the state of the case, the fact must be so "; then I should have added intel- lectual insight into a relation of ideas. In like manner, were I to draw several lines between two points, and then measure them, finding so that the straight line actually was the shortest, the perception concerned would be only one of sense ; while from mere relations of ideas to perceive that it must be so, would be one of intellect. In the remaining cases, likewise, I might actually measure the three angles in one or more triangles, the respective squares once or oftener, &c., &c. ; but the result of such measurement would be simply to find the state of the case, in each instance, so. To allege measurement as my reason for asserting the result, would be to state a fact just found, a fact just sensuously seen, not a relation of ideas intellectually perceived. Such truths as these quantitative ones can evidently, therefore, be regarded in both ways, now sensuously, and again intellectually. But there are a great many truths that admit of being regarded only in one way. Some intel- lectually alone, and some sensuously alone. Suppose I were to establish the truth of the immortality of the soul, or that of the existence of God, I could not bring forward, in either case, actual sensible perception of actual sensible fact. Even to prove the existence of the soul itself, I cannot put an actual soul into anybody's hands, or hold up an actual soul to any- body's eyes. So God let me prove as I may, I cannot show God. Nay, even in much that is material, we are pre- cisely similarly situated : who, for example, will show me an atom or put an atom into my hands ? Proof in regard to the soul, or in regard to God, consists in argument from facts, and proof in regard to atoms, or in regard to sulphur