Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 9.djvu/546

 534 J. HUTCHISON STIELING : the entire sceptical inquiry ; while what it was that put him upon this doubt constitutes with Hume the absolute princi- pium, the absolute apxtj, the absolute first germ, whether > we take it as principle or as beginning. Now, in general, the first of Hume, philosophically, was I the study of Locke, than whom it is doubtful to me whether Hume knew, at least well, any philosopher else. Further, I am disposed to conjecture that what in Locke was specially suggestive for Hume lay abundantly in those, Locke's most original, striking, copious, and end- lessly repeated considerations in regard to substance. In any point of view, the two ideas, substance and causality, lie at all times very near each other ; and there are even expres- sions in Locke that, though blindly and unwittingly for him, bring both into the same light. I shall transcribe a few of these here, though by a long way not all. (1) I shall begin with the most comprehensive relation, wherein all things that do or can exist are concerned, and that is the relation of cause and effect ; the idea whereof, how derived from the two fountains of all our knowledge, sensation and reflection, I shall in the next place consider (Essay, ii., 25, 11). (2) General certainty is never to be found but in our ideas ; whenever we go to seek it elsewhere in experiment or observations without us, our knowledge goes not beyond particulars (iv., 6, 16). (3) The simple ideas, united in the same subject, are yet perfectly distinct (ii., 2, 1). (4) In some of our ideas there are certain relations, habitudes and connexions so visibly included in the nature of the ideas themselves that we cannot conceive them separated from them by any power whatever. And in these only we are capable of certain and universal knowledge. Thus the idea of a right-lined triangle carries with it an equality of its angles to two right ones (iv., 3, 29). (5) We can know the truth and so may be certain in propositions that affirm something of another which is ii necessary consequence of its precise complex idea, but not contained in it. As that the external angle of all triangles is bigger than either of the opposite internal angles (iv., 8, 8). (6) Were there now no circle existing anywhere in the world, yet the idea annexed to that name would not cease to be what it is (iii., 3, 19). (7) All the discourses of the mathema- ticians about the squaring of a circle, conic sections, or any other part of mathematics, concern not the existence of any of those figures ; but their demonstrations which depend on their ideas are the same, whether there be any square or circle existing in the world or no (iv., 4, 8). (8) The idea of substance we neither have nor can have by sensation or reflection. Since, then, by those ways whereby other ideas are brought into our minds, this is not, we have no such clear idea at all ; and therefore signify nothing by the word, but only an uncertain supposition of we know net what idea (i., 4, 18). (9) The obscure and indistinct, vague idea of thing or something is all that is left to the positive idea which has the relation of a support or substratum to modes or accidents ; and thus the mind, from the positive simple ideas got by sensation and reflection, comes to the general relative idea of substance (ii., 2, 2, note). (10) Our ideas of tin; species of substances are nothing but certain collections of simple ideas united in one subject ; for these, then, names stand (iv. 3, 9). (11) simple ideas carry with them no visible necessary connexion or