Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 9.djvu/535

 A CLASSIFICATION OF FEELINGS, II. 523 sibilities of feeling as it corresponds directly with activity of the organism pure and simple. The moment the action of the organism brings it into contact with a resisting body in the environment, at that moment a reaction of the en- vironment is added to the action of the organism, a state of feeling corresponding with this reaction is added to that which corresponds with the action ; and the total feeling that results is compounded of the two. Then arise the feelings of Eesistance, Hardness, Softness, Elasticity and the like states of mind that are more cognitive than sensi- tive, and that need only be referred to here for the sake of formal completeness. (Genus 3.) It will be remembered that, in the case of the Environ- mentally-initiated feelings, we considered as a case of inter- action between the organism and the environment the mere relation to the organism of an agent or event in the environ- ment, even though the agent should never actually act upon the organism nor the event actually occur. The feeling, we found, corresponded with the relation to the organism of an action that was potential only of an activity, real or not, but cognised. Similarly, in the Organismally-initiated class, we find that feelings may correspond with the relation to the environment of an act or group of acts of the organism which have not yet occurred and may never occur which are as yet only possible or potential. As in the former case, the relation, to elicit a feeling, must be cognised, and, as in that case, the feeling corresponds with the relation that is cognised, correctly or no, and not necessarily with the rela- tion that actually exists. In the former case the means by which the cognition of the activity in the environment was reached, was regarded as outside the scope of our inquiry as pertaining to the region of cognition and not of feeling ; and similarly in this case the means whereby the organism forms an estimate of its own powers is for the present pur- pose disregarded. We have to postulate that such an esti- mate is formed, and upon that estimate, and the relations that it bears to cognitions of environmental circumstances, are founded the Emotions of the Organismally-initiated group. Every activity of the organism requires for its fulfilment the existence of certain environmental circumstances. We cannot eat without food, nor drink without liquid, nor work without materials, nor converse without companions, nor take long walks on board ship, nor exercise any activity whatever unless the appropriate circumstances exist in the environment. The existence of these circumstances I call the outlet of