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 w. G. MILLER'S PHILOSOPHY OF LAW. once. This order appears to be derived by Mr. Miller from his own meditations on the Kantiau categories. Being myself of the opinion, orthodox or not, that Kant's categories are the dreariest and least profitable portion of his work, and that the whole scheme is contrary to his own better principles, I cannot pretend to be interested in this development of Mr. Miller's. The kind of result it gives him is to add to Sir Henry Maine's now well-known law of the progress of society "from status to contract " the extended formula that " society has progressed from contract (causality) to reciprocity " ; which does not appear to me luminous enough to justify the wisdom of the method that gave it birth. My doubtful impression is that, if I knew what it meant, I should not agree with it. The -application of the anti- nomies to the generalities of politics and law, which Mr. Miller proceeds to make in somewhat the same fashion, is not less ingenious and more amusing, but I fail to see that any good comes of it. And then, up and down the book we may learn such things as this : that the reason why carelessness which does no harm to any one is not a common-law offence, is " because the person offending does not set up his will as right in antagonism to the universal will ". Sir, nous diomus que tiels paro/x ne sount mye profitables pur lentendement del comen ley or in English : I must confess that, little as I like Austin, I think the present state of the English student set down to Austin is more tolerable than it would be under the dispensation of Scoto-Hegelianism. There is a certain cheerful simplicity, too, about Mr. Miller's tran- scendental creed. He bids critics ponder the fact that the his- torical development of legal ideas is in accordance with Hegel's scheme. Perhaps it is : but if any philosopher of ability, let alone Hegel, constructed a theory of development capable of being contradicted in any large application by well known his- torical facts, we should not only disagree with his theory, but call him a bad workman. A lawyer, as such, exists but on sufferance in these pages. Yet I must point out that dealers in transcendental jurisprudence are apt, while their heads are in the stars, to let their feet go astray in the more terrestrial automata media of the science ; and I fear Mr. Miller has not wholly escaped this peril. Thus he says that " very little of our constitutional law is due to judicial decision " : a dictum hard to reconcile with a good many de- cisions, ancient and recent, which have been thought to have something to do with it, and of which Bradlaugh v. Gosset, the latest example, is also a good typical one. His occasional re- marks on American institutions appear to confuse things which are accidental and may be the expression of a particular theory with things essential for the existence of a federal state. The Supreme Court of the United States has to judge of the validity of legislative acts, not because of a modern " tendency to disregard form in order to attain substantial justice," but because neither a