Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 9.djvu/446

 434 j. SULLY' s OUTLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY. no sense of individuality, no consciousness of self as a mental existence, save through the intimate union of knowing, feeling and acting. Knowing, when we view it in abstracto, implies solely, as its formal and general characteristic, the dual opposition be- tween knower and known, an opposition not of two entities or facts, but an opposition which is contained in and makes the essence of the act of knowing. But so far there is given nothing beyond mere generality, and we might analyse knowledge to any extent without discovering in it aught that would serve as ade- quate foundation for the conception of the individual self. Only in activity is there individualising force, and only through feeling which accompanies every change of mental being is there effected a junction between the striving or impulse that is the secret of individual life and knowing which makes that life conscious and intelligent. The threefold cord of conscious life we may subject to isolated treatment, and in the course of its development the relative proportions of its factors exhibit the most wonderful varieties, but its unity is the indispensable fact with which in tracing the history of the human mind we have to start. Such a conception allows us not only to render quite precise the rela- tion of psychological analysis to other branches of philosophy, but serves to determine the course of psychological exposition and to illuminate its separate problems. It is through and in the conscious life of the individual that all the thinking and acting which may form the material for other treatment is realised, and with the content of that thought or action the psychologist, as such, has not to deal. Where we isolate the content and treat it as having a quasi existence per se, we are in the attitude of objective or natural science. Where we endeavour to interpret the significance of the whole, to determine the meaning of the connective links which bind it together, we are in the attitude of philosophy. But when we regard the modes through which knowing and acting are realised in the life of the individual sub- ject we are in the position of the psychological inquirer. It is the sole and the whole business of the psychologist to trace the history of the conscious life of the individual subject, and it is in the notion of the individual subject that he will find the limits of his treatment. In parts of his work, as before said, Mr. Sully does approach this view, but he does not always remain true to its guidance. Were we to adopt as our principle in psychological exposition this notion of the individual conscious subject, we should find that the course of exposition was determined for us. The condi- tions under which the mental life of the individual is possible would form the matter for the first general division of the treat- ment, and we should be able to carry with us from this general treatment propositions that would find their special application in the analysis of more complex phases. The three chapters of Mr. Sully's book, already signalised (chs. ii.-iv.), seem to me to