Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 9.djvu/145

 F. H. BBADLEY'S PRINCIPLES OF LOGIC. 133 experiment a new relation can be reached ; we can indicate only the general principle which guarantees the possibility inferring under each category. Let the category, for example, be that of synthesis in space, as when I say ' A is to the right of B, and B is to the right of C ' ; then there can be indicated generally what kind of conclusion can be drawn and the principle of connexion on which the ideal experiment proceeds. The actual conclusion is perceived, seen to follow, and is not drawn by any rigid syllo- gistic process. Again, the syllogism has insisted on a major premiss, has viewed inference as being procedure by subsuniption of a less under a more general. Not only is this hard to recon- cile with the notion of inference as giving a new relation ; not only is it quite out of keeping with the kinds of reasoning that occur constantly in experience, e.g., mathematical construction and the like ; but it altogether misconceives the relation between a principle of reasoning and the reasoning itself. A principle is not a general model or axiom by reference to which we reason ; reasoning is a function which embodies a principle, is its living ex- ponent. The two are not to be severed as they are in syllogism. Dismissing, thus, the syllogism, and I think that, as that form is commonly expressed, we should agree in doing so though perhaps with milder language, Mr. Bradley notes the main prin- ciples which underlie his types of reasoning. These_axe_identity within the element^ of tVip. i'dpa.1 p-yppripipnt and~umversality_Q{ one premiss. different aspects of the same. This identity, as previously in the case of the so-called law of thought, is taken with a genuine metaphysical significance, but here with a pos- sibly misleading stress laid on the subjective side. The ground of reasoning, it is said, is the assumed real identity of that which is identical in ideal content ; by which one might well under- stand the empty identity of the syllogistic form, that the middle term shall be the same. But we cannot take "ideal content" in this abstract sense, or regard it as in any way conditioned by the subjective process of thinking. It is significance or meaning, the real viewed in its essential character for thought as the union of universal and particular. The notion of correspondence be- tween ideal content and reality is ambiguous and can only lead to a quite contradictory result. On this ground I am altogether disinclined to accept, in lieu of the syllogism, as necessarily arising out of judgment, the subjective processes of construction and the like on which Mr. Bradley expands himself. Nor do I follow him in his criticism of the syllogistic form as fallaciously at- tempting to draw a conclusion which must be left to the private judgment of the individual thinker. No doubt, the ordinary mode of expressing the syllogism through concrete instances is deeply in fault ; no doubt, also, the class-idea on which the syllogism is made to turn is a veritable abstraction which cannot be regarded as the life of reasoning. But the concrete inferences, which are supposed to show the incompetence of syllogistic form