Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 9.djvu/137

 F. H. BRADLEY'S pmyciPLES OF LOGIC. 1-2-3 almost as numerous as treatises on Logic, turn for the most part on psychological differences. Only a vigorous effort to determine generally the fundamental characteristics of the points of view from which Logic and Psychology respectively contemplate know- ledge, or a detailed criticism of the several doctrines with this general aim in view, can aid us in coming to a really fruitful decision as to the function and scope of logical science. It is as making a large and powerful contribution towards this end that one hails Mr. Bradley 's work. He does not profess to work out in systematic completeness a doctrine of logic, but, partly by polemical discussion of views, partly by presentation of results based on a more sound and penetrating analysis of the function of thought, he has not only cleared the way of much that for long has been an almost insuperable obstacle, but has also drawn attention to the real nature of logical problems and i the discussion of them to a platform indefinitely higher j than that occupied by our current logical thinking. His work is ./ not one of winch it is easy to give any brief and connected account, and the difficulties of a reviewer are somewhat aggra- vated by the peculiarities of the author's style and method. In a matter of this kind, no doubt, much must depend on the indi- vidual's turn of thinking, but I should fear that some part of the good effect that ought to be produced by Mr. Bradley's work will not be realised because the reader will fail to seize the leading idea of the whole. The discussion grows in complexity as it is developed, and partial views are taken up into and superseded by the more comprehensive solutions. But there is throughout im- plied a method of regarding the whole business of thought that is not brought with sufficient clearness to the front, and the point of many isolated treatments may in consequence be missed. Mr. Bradley has chosen his own way, and has worked towards a theory_of_iudgment and inference, by taking up, comparing, setting against the current teaching, and carefully sifting empirically selected types of judgments and reasonings. Such a method has its advantages for teaching-purposes, but it i& apt to mislead unless the underlying principles which guide the whole discussion are clearly discerned. Mr. Bradley hardly brings these forward into sufficient prominence, though he might well have done so, and it requires a long-breathed reader to ac- company him through his devious course. Perhaps this one complaint may connect itself with the remark in Mr. Bradk- preface that critics of different tendencies may object that the treatment contains too much or too little metaphysics. I can- not think that Logic as a_vvhole is in any way independent of Metaphysics, though I fully aTfinit that, as metaphysics covers a multitude of problems, it is not necessary that into every section all the rest should be dragged, nor do I imagine that the occa- sional distinctions drawn by Mr. Bradley between logic and metaphysics indicate a contrary opinion. What is alone of