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 632 NEW BOOKS. sics if metaphysics be supposed possible. Starting from the distinction ar- rived at in his Grundlagen einer Erkenntnissiheorie (see MIND x. 310) between the point of view of " natural science" and the point of view of "psycho- logy," he shows that as the body is the centre to which everything belong- ing to the external world or the world of perception appears as in relation, so feeling is the centre for the relations of the internal world or the world of representation. Through the body, itself a group of perceptions, all perceptions are mediately in relation with the internal world, and so with feeling. Feeling, which appears on the one side as determined by repro- duction of presentations, on the other side determines it. With feeling, desire and volition are inseparably bound up. The work, accordingly, falls into three divisions, dealing respectively with Reproduction, Feeling and .Will, which are subdivided as follows : Section i. c. 1, "Reproduction," 2, " Association," 3, " Abstraction and Reflection " ; Section ii. c. 1, " The Life of Feeling in general," 2, " The Life of Feeling in particular " ; Section iii. c. 1, " Necessity," 2, Wish and Will," ' 3, " Free-will ". Nearly all psychical phenomena, in the author's view, can be partially ex- plained by the recognised laws of association ; but associationists have neglected feeling, which, though it does not itself associate ideas but only directs and strengthens associations, is yet of the greatest importance (p. 26). Abstraction, again, cannot be fully explained by resemblance and more frequent repetition in consciousness of certain representations. For complete explanation, it has to be seen that the representations to which the strongest feelings of pleasure and pain are attached come into the fore- ground, and that thus attention directs itself to these and they are most strongly distinguished. Ultimately, every intellectual as well as every volitional process is to be explained by reference to pleasure or avoidance of pain, which alone has " value ". " Necessity " is reduced psychologically to a form of expectation ; " physical necessity " being defined as the expec- tation of future perceptions in accordance with past perceptions, " psychi- cal necessity" as the expectation of future representations and feelings in accordance with the past. In the last chapter the author contends that " freedom of choice," without " freedom of will," is a sufficient basis of moral responsibility. Geschichte der Ethik. Darstellung der philosophischen Moral-, Staats- und Social- Theorien des Altertnums und der Neuzeit. Von Dr. KARL KOSTLIN, o.o. Professor an der Universitat Tubingen. Erster Band : Die Ethik des classischen Alterthums. Erste Abtheilung. Tubingen : H. Laupp, 1887. Pp. xii., 493. This promises to be a very full history of ethical and political theories in ancient and modern times. It is called a " History of Ethics " ; but, as the author tells us, he understands by " Ethics " not merely the science of morality, but the whole of practical philosophy, including, in particular, the philosophy of society and the State (p. 6). The present volume takes in the pre-Socratics, the Sophists and Socrates, Plato and the older Academy. The exposition of doctrines is preceded by a general introduc- tion on practical philosophy, its subject-matter, its methods and its divisions (pp. 1-115), and by a special introduction on the character of Greek Ethics and its sources in Greek life (pp. 119-159). The three chief questions that practical philosophy must ask are found to be : (1) What are the ends of human action 1 (2) What are its laws 1 (3) What are the con- ditions of the realisation of human ends and laws ? A principal point of the last investigation is to determine the real objective order to be given to the collective life of men in order that the ends and laws of man may be realised. Ancient and modern Ethics are to be specially studied, because