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 NEW BOOKS. 621 itself to theology. Sensualistic philosophy is chronologically later than the two others. It has the same relation to the biological sciences that the other forms of metaphysics have respectively to the sciences of inorganic nature and to the social sciences. Though sometimes brought into alliance with materialism (as by Hobbes and by the French Sensationalists of the 18th century) and sometimes with idealism (as by Berkeley), it is essen- tially a distinct type of metaphysics, having for the ultimate terms of its ontology "sensations" that is, those psychical phenomena of which the biological conditions are first discovered and the " representations " that result from them. What determines the character assumed by each meta- physical doctrine in every age is the state of the positive sciences in that age. This is the " law of correlation between science and philosophy". In general no affiliation of philosophies to one another is to be attempted. They depend, not on the previous state of philosophy, but on contemporary social conditions ; the dominant condition being the state of the positive sciences. The " metaphysical stage " of philosophy is characterised by its " false independence " of the sciences. The positive sciences, on the other hand, are uninfluenced, or only influenced to their injury, by metaphysical doctrines. Each positive science depends for its development on the ante- cedent sciences, as philosophy depends on them all. The scientific philo- sophy of the future will resemble the philosophies of the past in being a this, that it will not be hypothetical, hypotheses having their place in special science where they can be verified, not in philosophy where they are assumed simply because knowledge has not yet become scientific, but will be a synthesis of all the general results of the sciences, including the as yet rudimentary group of the psychical and social sciences. Positivism may be regarded as its " anticipation ". Essai sur le Libre Arbitre, sa Theorie et son Histoire. Par GEORGE L. FONSE- GRIVE, Professeur agre'ge' de Philosophic au Lycee de Bordeaux. Ouvrage couronn^ par 1'Academie des Sciences Morales et Politiques. Paris : F. Alcan, 1887. Pp, 592. This is a history of the question of free-will, followed by a theory, founded on historical criticism, of the relations of freedom and necessity. The history is treated in three books, dealing respectively with " Pagan Thought," '"Christian Theology " and " Modern Philosophy ". The theore- tical part, which is rather shorter than the historical part, is again divided into three books, entitled " Criticism," " The Thesis " and " The Conse- quences ". The historical account of doctrines is extremely good and im- partial, and is full of interest of detail. The same may be said of the criti- cal part. The theological doctrines in particular, in which the author has taken special interest, are treated in such a way as to bring out exactly their philosophical bearing. All that can be attempted here is to give a summary of the author's positive results. The opposition of necessity and freedom, in the shape finally given to it by pagan philosophy, he finds to be : " How can the free-will of man be reconciled with the order esta- blished by Providence ? " This form of the opposition had only been arrived at after a long development from the doctrine of an absolute fate or necessity, which was common to primitive Greek religion and to early philosophy. The place of freedom in the world was first clearly marked out by Aristotle, who recognised the element of contingency in that which depends on man, TO tfi r][uv : affirming that man is irresistibly attracted towards the good, but allowing him at the same time the power of choosing freely among the means to good. Opposite positions still continued to be taken ; but, as the result of the development from Socrates, the "necessity"
 * ' conception of the universe ". Its difference from them will consist in