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 NEW BOOKS. 613 lower animals ". The twofold division, as he points out, corresponds to Aristotle's distinction of the " Gnostic " and the " Orective " powers ; and, throughout, he seeks an Aristotelian basis for his psychological positions. " The motive powers " are divided into " the emotions, the conscience and the will". The work, accordingly, falls, after a short introduction, into three parts : "The Emotions" (pp. 7-192), "The Conscience" (pp. 195-227), "The Will, or Optative Power" (pp. 231-267). The section on the Emo- tions is divided into two hooks of approximately equal length, entitled "The Four Elements or Aspects of Emotion" and "Classification and Description of the Emotions ". This part is largely an abridgment of the author's work on The Emotions (noticed in MIND v. 290). An outline of its leading positions will be found in the notice just referred to, and in a Note by the author in MIND ii. 413-15. As regards Conscience, Dr. M'Cosh's position is that " by the moral sense we know more than we do by the senses, inner or outer "(p. 196). " The Conscience is not merely co-ordinate with the other powers : it is above them as an arbiter and a judge. . . . In fact, it is the Practical Reason" (pp. 209-10). The moral power " is in all men native and necessary ; but it is a norm requiring to be evolved". The facts of its historical development "may be admitted, while we hold that the moral power could not have been produced without a native moral norm any more than a plant or animal could have been produced without a germ ". That which, in intelligent; beings, is com- mended by the conscience, is " love ruled by law " (p. 227). Will is some- thing different from an exercise of the understanding, of conscience or of the emotions. Moral good and evil consist essentially not in emotion nor in the possession of a conscience, any more than in the mere external action, but in " an act of will ". Responsibility is coextensive with will. In the discussion of the place of voluntary preference in virtue, of the relations of habit and responsibility, and of the characters of virtue and vice, the author's dependence on Aristotle is especially evident. The will, he contends, " has freedom," because it is not " determined by motives," if by motives be meant " powers out of the will acting independently of it " (p. 259). The influence of will in mental acts that are not classed as volitional is pointed out without exaggeration. The "main Secondary Law" of Association is found to be "that those ideas come up most frequently on which we have bestowed the largest amount of force of mind, and this may be intellect, feeling or will " (pp. 243-4). " The energy bestowed on an idea " " commonly takes the form of Attention," which is an act of will. Altogether, the work has the merits of the author's pre- vious work on The Emotions. The section on Will especially is full of sound psychological distinctions and observations. The Game of Logic. By LEWIS CARROLL. London : Macmillan & Co., 1887. Pp. 96. In this pretty little volume, the author of Alice in Wonderland, without surrendering his old playful purpose, tries to give youthful readers some general notion of logical processes. The design is worthy of all praise : for nothing should be easier, if teachers were knowing enough, than to convey with the first lessons in grammar a great deal of useful logical doctrine ; and children might have much amusement of a cheap kind in watching the logical practice of their elders, even if not set to regular games with propositions and arguments. It is not so clear that the author has taken the best way for working out his purpose. He has a new mode of graphi- cally representing propositions (by full or empty compartments within a square), which is sufficiently ingenious, but which seems to put rather heavy shackles upon the juvenile reasoner exposed to the common speech