Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 12.djvu/61

 48 j. WAED : since they have different dimensions in length. But psycho- logists seem to be aware of no confusion when they talk in- differently of states of mind, contents of mind, acts of mind ; treat the same fact now as a process, now as a product ; and range on one level feelings which presuppose presentations and acts which presuppose feelings. Some of the most striking instances of what might be called by analogy this arbitrary change of systematic units are to be found in Sir W. Hamilton's writings. 1 But probably all psychological writ- ing, even the clearest, is marked by this varying use of terms involving incompatible complications and by surreptitious changes of standpoint ; as if, for example, one should attempt to compare a quantity of electricity measured by one system of units with a quantity of heat measured by another, or try to find the locus of a curve the ordinates of which have no common origin. If then we take an example from Prof. Bain himself it will be because it is one which also seems to further the main purpose of this paper. With this view let us examine his general analysis of mind : 2 " The only account of mind strictly admissible in scientific psychology consists in specifying three properties or functions Feeling, Will or Voli- tion, and Thought or Intellect. . . . FEELING includes all our pleasures and pains, and certain modes of excitement or consciousness simply that are neutral. . . . The two leading divisions of the feelings are commonly given as Sensations and Emotions (p. 2). ... A Sensation is defined as the mental impression, feeling or conscious state resulting from the action of ex- ternal things on some part of the body, called on that account sensitive (p. 27). . . The emotions, as compared with the sensations, are secondary, derived or compound feelings (p. 226). WILL or VOLITION comprises all the actions of human beings in so far as impelled or guided by Feelings. . . . THOUGHT, INTELLECT, Intelligence or Cognition includes the powers known as Per- ception, Memory, Conception, Abstraction, Eeason, Judgment and Imagina- tion. It is analysed, as will be seen, into three functions, called Discrimi- nation or Consciousness of Difference ; Similarity, or Consciousness of Agreement ; and Retentiveness, or Memory " (p. 2). Now this is substantially an unimpeachable account of the broad facts of mind, and yet the moment we scrutinise the logical implications of the terms here singled out by italics, their want of precision becomes unmistakable. At the outset we are told of three properties or functions of Mind, as if there were no difference between predicating property and function ; whereas, as soon as we raise the question, we become aware that while everything has properties, functions unless metaphorically employed pertain only to agents. 1 Cp. instances previously given in MIND viii. 476, note. 2 The references, unless otherwise stated, are to Prof. Bain's Mental and .Moral Science.