Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 12.djvu/607

 594 CBITICAL NOTICES I lative psychology". Nothing is more commendable in a philo- sopher than the courage, in the face of the opposing dogmatisms of materialistic and metaphysical theories of the universe, to admit that there are some things which we do not know, though in this instance the courage displayed in the text is tempered by a somewhat unnecessary apology to Mr. Herbert Spencer in a note. The only point in which Prof. Fowler's treatment of this subject seems to me to be less satisfactory than could be wished, is that there runs through his treatment a tacit assumption that all impulses to action, whether in man or beast, must be either egoistic, altruistic or a mixture of the two. No difference seems to be recognised between an animal instinct and a self- conscious desire. I may add that in the earlier portion of the work the word 'desire' seems to be almost studiously avoided. Instincts, emotions, desires, and perhaps other psychical activities, are all described as "feelings". But, perhaps, the distinction which I desiderate would be brushed aside by Prof. Fowler as " metaphysical". When we come to the fundamental question of the nature of "good" and its relation to pleasure, Prof. Fowler declares for differences of quality or kind, as distinct from mere differences of quantity. At times, indeed, he does not seem to exhibit very clearly the distinction between a quantitative and a qualitative difference. Thus, on p. 164, higher good seems to be almost identified with greater pleasure in the future ; and on p. 266 the superiority of the higher pleasures seems to be made to depend mainly or entirely upon its greater per- manence. There can be no doubt, however, on which side of the controversy he really means to declare himself. Indeed, it is not altogether clear that, in Prof. Fowler's conception, the term "good" is identified with "pleasure," even of the highest pos- sible order. " The good of man ... as a whole," he tells us, " may be conceived of as the development of the various parts of his nature in harmony with one another, and with the social and material medium in which he exists " (p. 264). Elsewhere we are told that the good of any part of an organic being is " the satis- faction or development of that part, and the good of the whole the development of its entire nature, or the attainment of that end or those ends for which it is naturally fitted " (p. 263). In such definitions not merely the word but the idea of pleasure seems to be altogether eliminated ; except, indeed, in so far as it may be covered by the use of the term "satisfaction"; but if by "satisfaction" is meant "pleasure," it is difficult to see how a " part "of an organic being can be said to feel pleasure. Nor is it possible, without a good many assumptions (Aristotelian or Spencerian) which Prof. Fowler, at all events, makes no attempt to justify, to make the " satisfaction," whether of the part or the whole nature, identical with its "development". Want of space prevents me from pointing out the amount of non- sensationalistic metaphysics which are involved in the identifica-