Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 12.djvu/589

 ON FEELING AS INDIFFERENCE. BY Professor A. BAIN. The question whether we have states of mind properly describ- able as Feelings and yet neither pleasurable or painful, is at this moment answered in opposite ways by psychologists. Yet very large consequences seem to depend on it ; and any hesitation as to the side that we ought to take may mean that we abandon the discussion of some of the vital problems of Psychology. I write the following lines with the hope of eliciting some further discussion on the subject in MIND. It is not wholly a question of definition. There is a strong temptation to make it so. In the unavoidable vagueness of sub- jective phenomena, it is a great relief to have a few cases of unmistakable preciseness ; and among them we may note the distinction of pleasure and pain. Although these are ultimate facts, and cannot be defined by analysis, they are not the less decisively marked out in our consciousness ; they are never con- founded either with each other, or with states that are neither. Hence a generic name that comprehends those two states as its species is a well-defined genus. To treat Feelings as made up of Pleasures and Pains is to leave no doubt or uncertainty as to what we mean by the word. We seem to have got triumphantly over a difficulty of no small amount. After ' Consciousness,' the word ' Feeling ' is one of the serious troubles of psychological definition. This solution, in spite of its advantages, is not universally accepted. For example, Eeid divides feelings into the agreeable, the disagreeable and the indifferent^ and considers the last- named class to be the most numerous. He exemplifies them by referring to those of our sensations that serve no end but to mark difference, as in distinguishing one human voice from another. Now it will probably be allowed that these states are very often quite indifferent as regards pleasure and pain. This, how- ever, is not decisive. Considering their exclusively intellectual significance, we might refuse to class them with pleasures and pains under the genus Feeling, and might insist on placing them entirely in the sphere of the Intellect. We might call them intellectual sensations or sense-presentations, and regard them as the antithesis of Feeling and as not proper to be included in the region of mind so denominated. In fact Reid omitted the case that gives strength to his posi- tion ; that is to say, he left entirely out of account the fact familiarly known as Excitement, upon the exact import and bearing of which the question finally rests. None of Eeid's instances would fall under this designation ; while it covers