Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 12.djvu/385

 372 F. H. BKADLEY I generally when we use " activity ". And when we come to the soul and the perception of our own activity, it is perhaps going too far to say that without an idea of the change no rudimentary form of that perception would come. 1 But in seeking for the minimum that must be apprehended, we cannot postulate less than a concrete and limited self- group, and a following alteration of this as against its limit. Further, the origin of this change is not to be referred to an other, nor do I think the mere absence of such a reference would be enough. The origin, as well as the process and result, must be felt to belong to the self-group, and for this the change must ensue, not only from the permanent cha- racter, but also from a present occasional feature. Now I do not deny the theoretical possibility of an ultimate state of mind holding all these constituents and so yielding the idea of activity on reflection. What I deny is the presence of one shred of evidence for the existence of such a state. That ' motor ' feelings of any kind should supply such a complex seems to me quite preposterous. And what I cannot under- stand is how, without some apprehension of a concrete self with limits, and its change in time as arising from itself, anything like activity can exist for the soul? And with all due respect for those who hold to (and some of whom build I know not what upon) the ultimate character of activity or resistance, I am left to conjecture that either they attach no definite meaning to these terms, or else some meaning which is foreign to them,, or else that they have never made any serious attempt to analyse that which they set down as irreducible. We have reached the knowledge of an object other than my self and in relation with it. We have to advance to the idea of something real by itself and independent of its con- nexion with my, feeling-centre. We may deal with this briefly. The object recurs often, and, in itself and in its environment, is mainly the same, hence it seems permanent and identical. But, on the other hand, it is variable ; and of its features some depend upon foreign relations, while 1 The account of this matter (MiND No. 43, pp. 316 ff.), to which I must refer, should be so far modified. Further, I did not mean to convey that I myself took desire to be essential. My own view is opposite to this. I must excuse myself from entering further into Mr. Ward's criticisms (MiND No. 45), on the ground that they seem based upon misunderstand- ings which a comparison with the present article may remove. 2 The soul may of course have been " active " long before for the outside observer. So used the phrase is harmless so long as it is felt to be unneces- sary, and is merely used. Cp. MIND No. 43, p. 317.