Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 12.djvu/186

 ON ' ASSOCIATION '-CONTROVERSIES. 173 Indeed without a detailed psychology of Association, I do not see how we can arrive at just definitions of the fundamental terms Impression, Sensation, Actuality, Reality, Presenta- tion, Perception, Idea, Representation, Thought. VII. What circumstances are proper to be included with Association as essential accompaniments of its work ? We cannot fully state the laws of Association without certain conditions of their operation, or certain co-operating influences of a non-intellectual kind. Both the Feelings and the Will play a part in the associating processes at every stage. Thus, as to Contiguity. The rate of coherence of two impressions is known to depend partly on the intensity of the consciousness on the occasions when the two are in com- pany, and partly on the endurance and repetition of the concurrence. Hamilton's law of Preference is simply the fact of conscious intensity due to special interest. There are, as it were, two distinct moments to be studied in giving an account of the associating process. The first is the original placing of the elements together, and the supplying of the conditions requisite to their adhesion. The second is the consequent resuscitation, which, too, has its conditions, over and above the foregoing. An association between two elements may be to all intents and purposes sufficient for obtaining the revival of the second on the pre- sentation of the first, yet the revival may not occur. The state of mind at the time may be either favourable or un- favourable to the recall of a past impression or idea ; and the determining influence at work may be due to the feelings or to the will. Hence the theory of Association is not com- plete without specifying the accompanying conditions, both for the moment of primary adhesion and for the moment of associative recall. The circumstances that give conscious intensity are not difficult to assign. The word ' Attention ' in its commoner meaning, as a voluntary prompting to concentration of mind, expresses a great deal, but not everything. There is concentration from mere excitement, painful and pleasurable, as distinguished from the attention under the will, although the two shade into one another. All I am contending for just now is that, with the associa- ting forces, we should include the emotional and volitional influences that are inseparable from their working and that must be taken account of according to their degree in each case. These forces do not of themselves make the Associa-