Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 12.djvu/183

 170 A. BAIN : if the scene is quite new, its elementary parts are not new ; and old impressions of hills and woods and streams have an influence on my present impression ; so that even the sensa- tion is not a pure or unmixed element to begin with. Then comes the definition of the Idea, or whatever name we choose to give to the persistence and reproduction of the scene as an effect of memory. How far does this mental reproduction correspond to the original, and what are its essential differences, drawbacks or points of inferiority ? When we speak of recalling a prospect to the mind, we must speak with due allowance for the difference. For some purposes the image is as good as the original ; hence we get into a way of speaking of the two in the same terms, or as if there were no difference at all. For other purposes, the difference needs to be accentuated, instead of being slurred over. No theory of Association can be sound that mistakes the character of the mental reproduction, to which Sensation and Association jointly contribute. Mr. Bradley's criticism of Association fastens on this part of the case. Freely allowing that there are facts corre- sponding to the two chief laws, he objects to the ways of stating these as absurd and self-contradictory. For example, as regards Contiguity, he says, " What was contiguous is now non-existent, and what is re-instated has never been contiguous". This comes of his putting an interpretation upon the meaning of re-instatement that nobody ever held, but which no doubt should be barred out by rigorous pre- cision of language. So severe, indeed, is Mr. Bradley's view of re-instatement, that he will not allow a second view of the actual thing to be called re-instatement. If I look up to-night at a starry constellation, I might be weak enough to say that I was repeating an old impression to the letter. Mr. Bradley says No. I cannot repeat a yesterday's pro- spect ; yesterday has passed, and cannot be lived over again. To-day's experiences are to-day's, and these only. I am not aware that any psychologist has guarded the statement of Association to this degree of nicety. I quite admit that there are circumstances that make it occasionally proper and desirable. Let me, therefore, learri from Mr. Bradley how to surmount the difficulty and fence the contra- diction. He states the law of Contiguity thus : " When elements have co-existed, they tend to be connected ". And again "Mental units which have co-existed cohere". Now this may be all very safe, but it has the defect of vagueness. To make it really useful there would be needed, first, some specification of the very general words ' element ' and 'unit' ;