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 168 A, BAIN : never confound it with the recall of abcdef at the instance of abc. It is a matter of psychological interest to ascertain the circumstances favouring the operation of similarity under diversity in cases involving important results; seeing that there is a cause of obstruction in the fact of diversity an obstruction often so serious as to render the recall a matter of doubt and uncertainty. In all this I am fully borne out by Mr. Sully. (See Outlines of Psychology, p. 268.) V. Whether Association can stand as one member in an enumeration of Faculties, such as those of Locke, Reid, Stewart, Hamilton ? It is not difficult to show that the Association of Con- tiguity is the greatest part of what is usually called Memory; while Similarity is a further aid. Moreover, that Similarity, assisted by Contiguity, explains the ordinary reasoning pro- cesses, as designated under Deduction and Induction, seems to me to admit of very little doubt, but I defer the considera- tion of it to the handling of the final topic of this paper. The placing of Association in the list of Intellectual Powers by Stewart has been abundantly shown to be tautological. VI. How should Association stand in reference to the great problems of Philosophy : the theories of Space, Time, Causality, Substance and the like ? On referring to the recent work of Professor Ferri upon Association (see MIND viii. 294, x. 124) I find that with him Association-theories are tested mainly by their bearing on his conclusions regarding these problems. His induction of the laws from the facts of our intelligence, apart from such questions, is, I think, extremely perfunctory. We are, at this moment, in the midst of a conflict of views as to the priority of Metaphysics and Psychology. If, indeed, the two are so closely identified as some suppose, there is no conflict ; there is, in fact, but one study. If, on the other hand, there are two subjects, each ought to be carried on apart for a certain length, before they can either confirm or weaken each other. I believe that, in strictness, a disinterested Psychology should come first in order, and that, after going on a little way in amassing facts, it should revise its fundamental assumptions, and improve its language and definitions : and, when so revised, should resume con- sideration of the wide field of mental facts of the neutral or disinterested kind those that deal with practical applications rather than with the metaphysical groundwork. After a few further strides, we might comeback again to the founda-