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 138 NEW BOOKS. traditional knowledge, without any attempt to make it acquire knowledge by a process of rediscovery, by " the method of Nature," as recommended by Mr. Spencer and by Rousseau. To "the creed of the 'New Education,'" We learn to do by doing, the author opposes "the apophthegm of Bias," Know -and then do. " First the head and then the hand ; finally the hand inspired -and guided by the head : " this is the principle of all professional and technical education, of "all rational practice". Again, the educational pro- cedure indicated by psychology is not synthesis throughout but decomposi- tion of aggregates into elements first, and then afterwards, in dependence on this, synthesis of elements. The teaching of geography, accordingly, should begin with the globe, and not with the topography of the district in which the child lives. The most important problem for the teacher is to determine what Prof. Bain calls "education values". Knowledge may be valuable (1) for its practical use, which may be either "direct" or "indi- rect " ; (2) for the mental power it gives, for its disciplinary effect, which maybe either "specific" ("intensive") on a part of the mind, as with mathematics, or " tonic " (" extensive ") on the whole mind, as with history and literature ; (3) as " culture," that is, " for the mental satisfaction com- ing from the conscious possession of it". The book is especially worthy of attention for its acute criticisms of Mr. Spencer, and of those who take the more distinctively " modern " views of education. The author often re- turns, for example, to the question as to the relative value of " first hand " and " second hand " knowledge, " knowledge of things " and " knowledge of books" ; and finds that in many cases, even when the former is avail- able, the latter is of more value. Classical education, he believes, can be maintained, if it is no longer made to exclude other studies, and if litera- ture is regarded as the end, grammar chiefly as the means. The Re-organisation of Philosophy. An Address delivered before the Aris- totelian Society, Nov. 8, 1886 (being the annual Presidential Address for the eighth Session of the Society). By SHADWORTH H. HODGSON, Hon. LL.D. Edin., Hon. Fellow of C. C. C. Oxford, President. Lon- don : Williams & Norgate, 1886. Pp. 60. In the present Aristotelian Address the most prominent topics are the relation of Erkenntnisstluorie and of psychology to the four rubrics of philosophy distinguished in the last Address (see MIND, xi. 123). The conclusions arrived at depend on the relation that is found to exist between "" agency " in science, physical and psychological, which belongs to the rubric of " Eeal Conditioning," and " the moment of reflective perception," which is the basis of the properly philosophical rubrics of " Distinction of Aspects " and " Analysis of Elements ". The error in the Erkenntniss- tluorie of the Germans has been to assume Subject and Object as known previous to philosophical reflection, and then to identify the Subject, assumed to be a real agency like those of science and ordinary life, with " the one moment of reflective perception " or of properly philosophical experience. This moment is " one moment " not because it is numerically one, but because there is "identity in kind of the moments of distinct con- sciousness " ; and there is no reason to suppose an "identical Self" corre- sponding to it as its "real condition". From this it follows that for the psychologist as for the philosopher there can be no "Self other than the real organism which is the complex of real conditions of the conscious- ness 1 ' ; Matter being the only "real agency" that science can recognise. What positions it is possible to take up as to the ultimate nature of matter and its origin, and as to the origin of consciousness, the author briefly indicates'; reserving his own solution, so far as he conceives a solution to be possible, for another occasion, when the fourth rubric or Constructive Branch of