Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 12.djvu/141

 128 CEITICAL NOTICES I conjoining. The trans- subjective is therefore involved in every judgment, for judgment is the comprehensive title for all such con joinings : directly, in so far as the reference to existence is concerned ; indirectly, in so far as the universality implies a mul- tiplicity of consciousnesses with common laws of conjoining. The principle of logical necessity, or of the necessity of thought dis- closed by survey of the facts of consciousness, is then the general expression for what is implied in trans-subjective knowledge. The sections (pp. 39-181) in which the general characteristics of Thought are discussed are to be cordially recommended ; they form an excellent contribution to the logic of the judgment, and contain much that would repay minuter discussion. Omitting them, I proceed to note how Prof. Volkelt deals with the principle of logical necessity from the point of view previously stated as regards the sphere of absolutely certain knowledge. So far as I understand his view, it may be expressed briefly thus : Whatever be the nature of the trans-subjective reference involved in thought, whatever explanation we may find or offer regarding its probability, the certainty which accompanies it has only sub- jective ground, rests only on the invincible belief that accompanies the activity of thinking. " Thought rests finally on an inner expe- rience of an intuitive kind " (p. 183), and this "is experience with the essential addition that the experience at the same time makes me aware of its validity for what is not experienced " (p. 189), i.e., for the trans-subjective. Thinking then does not so much imme- diately warrant the trans-subjective validity of its contents as insist that, if they have been correctly attained, they must have such validity. We proceed in thought, so to speak, with an ideal in view, the essential nature of which is presented by thought itself, but the rounded completeness of attainment is not necessarily in- volved. Moreover, thought is purely formal : it can neither create the trans-subjective to which it points, nor fashion for itself its own subjective ideal content. That an activity so condi- tioned should yet claim to disclose the trans-subjective is intelli- gible only if we assume, not empty identity between thought and the trans-subjective world, but a community in root and laws (201, cp. 502). Prof. Volkelt expressly declines, as not form- ing part of the epistemological problem, the inquiries into the metaphysical nature of this relation, or into the psychological fashion in which thought conies about in the inner life. Logical necessity, then, is the truly fruitful principle of objective cognition, and Prof. Volkelt proceeds to discuss how experi- ence, in the sense previously defined, and thought co-operate together in fashioning the contents of the objective knowledge we deem ourselves to possess. His answer, briefly put, is in sub- stance a modification of the Kantian view, but expressed with more specific reference to difficulties that have been raised since Kant's time. Thought gives to the contents of experience their objective reference, adds to them factors not supplied by experi-