Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 12.djvu/137

 124 CEITICAL NOTICES : " that all the acts claiming to constitute objective knowledge are inseparably united to the individual consciousness of the knower, that they have real existence primarily and immediately nowhere save in the consciousness of the individual, and that they are perfectly incapable of extending beyond the consciousness of the individual and of grasping or entering into the field of the real that lies beyond". The meaning of this passage is perhaps suffi- ciently clear, despite its strongly metaphorical expression, though one may be allowed to entertain a doubt as to the possibility of altogether freeing oneself from the direct suggestions of the meta- phors themselves. Knowing, says Prof. Volkelt in effect, is a process forming part of my individual mental life. It is there- fore subjective, and by itself alone cannot substantiate any claim to yield objectively valid results. Whatsoever be the result of a critical investigation into knowledge, that investigation must start from the acknowledgment of the subjective and therefore inhe- rently dubious character of every act of knowing. The cognitive individual may represent to himself an objective real as known, may represent to himself comparisons of his thought with the real as a test of their truth, may represent to himself other cogni- tive consciousnesses thinking or knowing the same as he does, but in every case he must acknowledge that his representing is a process in his own mind, and contains not in itself, in its own nature as fact, the warrant of its objective validity. It is legiti- mate to maintain, as a self-evident, ultimate principle, the propo- sition that knowing as an act is a process of mind ; I am directly aware of the existence of such a process, and the assertion of its existence has the strength of self -evidence. But I am entitled to no more than the assertion of such existence as a fact. Even if these subjective processes be more than facts in the mental life, even if they indicate necessities that go beyond the sphere of individual consciousness, such surplusage of significance is pri- marily for us something subjective ; it is certainty on our parts, and we have to ask how comes it that subjective certainty is taken as indicating objectivity of knowledge '? It is natural that, having so formulated the initial difficulty, Prof. Volkelt should find in Locke rather than in Kant the his- torical originator of Erkenntnisstheorie, and in fact, the state- ment of the question carries one inevitably to the precritical philosophies, to Cartesianism, e.g., to which Prof. Volkelt's method of starting the inquiry has many interesting points of resem- blance. Perhaps one might go so far as to maintain, though the extreme generality of these questions allows wide scope for varied interpretations, that the question as formulated by Prof. Volkelt is not a problem of the Kantian philosophy at all. Since objectivity implies on the one hand reference to existence lying beyond the limits of individual consciousness, and on the other hand validity for all consciousness, it is evident that nothing within the scope of consciousness can constitute objective know-