Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 11.djvu/96

 ON THE ANALYSIS OF COMPARISON. 85 idea with which the animal goes from the sugar to the salt. On this a fresh collision will take place. And another discrepancy will be felt when the idea of the dull salt collides with the sensa- tion of glittering sweetness. The two pieces now, while held together by their identical attributes, are forced apart by their differences, and in this passage between them the diversities become explicit. This I believe to be the way in which Comparison is developed. Its result, the perception of mixed identity and diversity, becomes, as an idea, the means for setting up the process which has yielded it. The chance result of groping is what gives the source of volun- tary movement. There are doubtless objections which will be taken to this fragmentary outline, but of these most will, I think, be founded on errors. I have dealt with some of them in my Principles of Logic, but there is one I may point out here. It will perhaps be said that my explanation is circular, since classification and com- parison exist from the first and are implied in the earliest form of recognition. But the facts, as I find them both in general and in particular, are irreconcilable with this view a view which, I believe, rests much less on observation than on preconceived ideas. And if an objector replies, But the comparison is yet 'latent,' it is 'virtual,' it is 'nascent,' it is only 'potential' that moves me not at all. I must be allowed to say openly that such ambiguous phrases have, until they are explained, no right to exist in a scientific psychology, and that, if they were ex- plained, their attraction would vanish. I have found that an assertion of 'potential' existence often stands for a 'nascent' perception of error ; and in that sense it is welcome. But I trust to meet with the general approval of psychologists when I say that in analysis there is still much to be done.