Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 11.djvu/91

 80 c. READ : Striking omissions from this scheme are perhaps not numerous. I note chiefly Sociality, the feeling that grows from the mere presence of the community, and which is most noticeable in the effect of the absence of its conditions, producing home- sickness, distress of exile, Heimn-fJi. Sympathy, too, or rather the sympathetic transfiguration of other feelings is wanting : the name Sympathy at p. 15, Table xiv., should surely be Com- passion. Weltschmerz deserves recognition now-a-days. So I think do Malice and Malevolence in Table xiv. of the Sympathetic Feelings. Loyalty, too, and the peculiar class-feeling of Honour or ' the point of Honour ', should appear in the social group. Perhaps the great generality, speciality or indirectness of some of these led to their being overlooked. I now come to objections which seem to me to lie against Mr. Mercier's classification because of the principle on which it is based. We saw that that principle fails to take account of the remoteness, speciality, generality and complexity of some of the interactions between the organism and the environment. Mr. Spencer has shown at great length how a cognitive correspond- ence of the organism to the environment develops ; and, though I cannot point out any explicit statement of his that alongside of the cognitive an emotional correspondence grows up, I believe every one will admit that this is a part of his doctrine ; and that the two parallel growths proceed upon similar principles, namely, by the integration of simpler cognitions on the one hand, and of simpler feelings and groups of feelings on the other, into more special, general, complex cognitions and emotions. It foil' from this (as Mr. Spencer shows) that neither Emotions nor Cognitions 1 can, except in the crudest way, be classified at all, because they cannot be separated. 1 This seems a good place to notice Mr. Mercier's earlier classification of Cognitions in MIXD XXX., p. 260-7. He there criticises Mr. S] ]; classification of 0< ignitions according to representativeness, uuich as we have seen him above take exception to Mr. Spencer's classification of Emotions ; but with less force, and in a style less safe from the charge of heing nieiely verbal. Mr. Mercier regards the fundamental distinction of cognition.- as lying 1 >et ween those that establish a new relation in consrioii-iiess. and those that merely revive a former one : degree of representativeness lie admits as a principle for subdividing these main classes. Hut he seems to admit also that in every cognition there is some element of novelty ; which requires the establishment of a new relation in consciousness : and plainly the seriality of consciousness makes it impossible to have twice an identical experience. Now cognition is the classification of experiei: which will vary from the most particular recognition to the most abstract Blibsumption ; will vary too in the complexity of the terms and relations classified : and of these variations representative]! :he lie-t mark. I may add that. OS Cognitions, like Emotions, develop by integration and by differentiation from common bases, they too can be only very im- perfectly classified ; and although a tabular scheme of their mutual relations, analogous to that which 1 have in view for Emotions, may be suggested, it will perhaps be still more difficult to realise.